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EFFECTS OF DELUSION:

OR,

MATERIALS TOWARDS A HISTORY

OF

TWO INVASIONS OF FRANCE.

By COLONEL SINCLAIR.

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THE SECRET CAUSES THAT PRODUCED, AND THE CONCEALED CHAIN THAT CONNECTED THE

TWO UNFORTUNATE EXPEDITIONS

OF

Champaigne in 1792, and of Quiberon in 1795,

ARE HERE LAID OPEN.

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PREFACE.

THE following short Treatise is intended to develope a part only of the hitherto concealed causes of the astonishing and disastrous retreat in Champaigne; and I mean to confine myself to the investigation of that part of those causes which depend upon the villainy and wrong views of some interested individuals. But the Essays upon the Quiberon Expedition will be found more amply to detail the operations of that Tragedy.

I do not intend at present to examine minutely into the underhand plans and ma-

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nœuvres

næuvres of the Combined Powers; for several reasons I shall reserve that till a future day, when it will be given in a work now in hand. Having served with the allies and royalists myself, and convinced that kingly government is the best form yet received, I do not wish even to have the appearance of attacking it, at a time when it has far too many enemies.

I am likewise persuaded that to do this, would be attended with no advantage to the cause which I once supported with my person, and at the expence of what fortune I could command.

I therefore attach myself to the discussion of the conduct of men, who by deceiving princes, have ruined them, and who, by betraying the trust of kings, have given them an opportunity of deserting the cause which they at first seemed to support.

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To the extravagant ambition, the intrigues, and the avarice of two individuals, the one already famous, (though in a wrong way) and the other obscure, I trace the emigration of the French noblesse—and likewise, the failure of their attempt to regain their country, and revisit their native land.

If it be true, that the gard-meuble of France was robbed, and the jewels pillaged; that the King and his family, and numbers of the nobility suffered on a scaffold, to please a set of obscure upstarts—that Legendre, the butcher, might live in the palace of a king, and Madam Talien wear the jewels of a queen; it is no less true, that the French emigrants were enticed to leave their homes, never again I fear to return, and become with their PRINCES objects of pity, in order that M. DE CALONNE AND ST. MORYS might have splendid levees at Coblentz in 1792!! The following

pages

pages are meant as a beacon to princes and to people to beware of trusting to ambitious and designing men ; if they answer that purpose I shall be fully rewarded for my trouble.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Effays and Letters, now reprinted, appeared last year in THE SUNDAY REVIEW, and were written by Colonel Sinclair, with an intention to discover to England, and to all Europe, the intrigues of those dangerous men to whom the present desperate situation of affairs is principally owing.

Monf. de Calonne, the primum mobile of the intrigues and of the intriguers, is a man of no ordinary abilities. Extravagant, and without arrangement in money affairs, guided also by an exorbitant ambition, he, in the course of a very few years that he was at the helm of the French finances, brought that nation to the verge of bankruptcy*. His conduct in office, by debasing the cur-

* When Calonne left the Comptroll General, the interest of the public funds, particularly life-rents, were in arrear—every other department the same. The Notables were assembled to rectify this, but not being empowered to act, they advised assembling the States General. The States General soon declared itself a National Assembly, and overturned the throne.

rent coin of that kingdom, by shutting up the bank of Paris, granting contracts and monopolies to worthless men, in order to supply his own extravagance*; but above all, his unprincipled application of the public wealth, reduced the nation to despair, and his virtuous sovereign to a state of absolute insolvency and mendicity. The virtues of that sovereign have since gained a lustre from adversity that no prosperity could ever have produced, and amongst his virtues, patience and mercy held the first place. Yet such was his indignation at the conduct of Calonne, that with his own hand he tore from the shoulders of the disgraced minister, the insignia of the order of the Holy Ghost, with which he had been decorated.

The general voice of the nation was so violent against Calonne, that he was obliged

* There are many entertaining anecdotes of this minister, and amongst others, his presenting Madame le Brun (the painter's wife) on Christmas-day, with a *Cornet de Bon Bons*, (box of sweetmeats) in which each sweetmeat was lapped up in a bank-note of a thousand livres!!! (42l. 13s. 4d. sterling) Could any Comptroller of national finance manage the treasury more gallantly?

to seek an asylum in this country, where he arrived in the summer of 1787.

Retired from an active life and an important office, the ex-minister sighed for importance still, and the press groaned under his heavy works on finance, directed against M. Necker, another state quack, with equal ambition, and as little modesty, but who loved order, understood and practised arrangement and economy.

The meeting of the States General in 1789, occasioned by the dilapidation in the finances, which begun under Calonne, was no sooner determined on than he left his retreat in England to canvass for a seat in that assembly; but so universally was he detested and feared, that he was obliged to return precipitately, not without considerable risque, and without having got further than into Normandy.

Foiled in his ambitious project, as one of the regenerators of France, Calonne immediately set about intriguing, to get into the
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good graces of the Count d'Artois, who emigrated when the French revolution began. From that fatal moment, which will ever be memorable in the history of mankind, a system of intrigue began with the different courts of Europe; but it was not till Monsieur (Comte de Provence) the present king of France, had emigrated, that Calonne began to expand his ambitious wings with hopes of success.

The treaty of Pilnitz, and the previous and subsequent arrangements, were all occasioned by what we are going briefly to relate*.

Calonne saw that the nobles and proprietors in France were ready to embrace any party that would give them protection. He saw, on the other hand, that foreign princes were alarmed at the rapid strides made by the Rights of Man, under the banners of

* The Coalition of Powers begun like a game of *Cross Purposes*, but ended very differently. The French were driven by fear to despair. Hence Robespierre and Marat ruled. The Coalesced Powers have all, collectively and separately, to rue their fatal credulity.

Liberty and Equality. What then did he do?—To the French nobility and gentry he said—“ Emigrate, and you will be protected “ by all the powers of Europe;” and to the powers of Europe he said,—“ Enter “ France with your armies, and you will “ be joined by the greatest part of the “ French people.”

It would require the pen of Homer to describe how the poor deluded French gentlemen crowded to Coblenz, from all quarters, breathing, panting, and killing their horses, *to arrive in time to enter France victoriously.*

Never did the wily serpent fascinate its prey, and charm innocent animals within its slimy grasp with greater success, than did this ambitious and intriguing courtier, at Coblenz !!! Those who emigrated first served as decoy-ducks for such as remained at home; and infamy was pronounced against all who would not obey the call.

The truth of this is well established; it is known to thousands, and would have been

still known to thousands more, had not the high-priest who led these unhappy men on their painful pilgrimage, offered them up *since a sacrifice, to satisfy his diabolical injustice, on the peninsula of Quiberon* *.

To the complicated intrigues of that moment, are to be attributed the complicated miseries of the period that has since elapsed, of which the following is a short outline.

To facilitate his operations, Calonne drew around him those underlings who had done his dirty work when he was in the zenith of his glory at Paris. A Monf. de St. Morys, a disgraced advocate of Paris, but an excellent engraver, and his brother, the Chevalier De Moligny, a subaltern officer of the police, much distinguished for his ingenuity in copying different hand writing, were established at

* Although the scene varied as well as the means, yet not *two* events in history are more evidently connected and more evidently contrived by the same men, than the Invasion of France in 1792, and the Invasion in 1795. In the first instance the Emperor and the King of Prussia were the dupes, in the last the British Ministers.—In both, the spring that gave the motion was the same.

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the head of a manufactory of false assignats, at Neuwied. With those it was proposed to pay the expences of the army, when it should arrive in France; but as the plans of the emigrants were always *bruited abroad**, this fine project was one very good reason for the French peasantry, and the nation at large, to resist their army when it did enter.

The Emperor and the King of Prussia were made to believe by Calonne, that the fortresses of France would open their gates to the royal army, as it was termed; but had France been so inclined, the very presence of Calonne would have prevented them; for in the eyes of Frenchmen, the Bastille did not represent despotism more completely than Calonne did the dissipation and corruption of the court. A portable

* The Emigrants from the beginning could only expect success from secrecy; yet such has been their imprudence, that every plan has been boasted of as soon as formed, and therefore *not one* has succeeded. But when we examine the description of people to whom every department has been entrusted under De Calonne, no imprudence or perfidy whatever can be wondered at. The Republicans have acted much more wisely.

bastille,

bastile, with its inverted cones and trap doors of oblivion, would not have been more obnoxious to the nation, had the princes carried it with them in their army. Add to this the threats held out to the ruling people in Paris, as well as to the inhabitants in general, it is no wonder that such a pestilential entry was vigorously resisted.

Before the army marched from Coblenz, the inspector, Gen. Schoenfeldt, belonging to it, who was sent by the King of Prussia, was astonished at, and ashamed of, the extravagant dilapidations in the finances under Calonne's care. A mistrust was already begotten, and when, instead of finding friends to embrace, they found brave and determined enemies to encounter; the disgust and mistrust turned to indignation.

Foreign armies entering France in August and September, with the active and energetic Dumourier in front, and enemies rising in a mass to oppose them; deceived by the minister

minister of those whose cause they were fighting, is it wonderful that the prudence of the Duke of Brunswick kept the Emigrant army out of action, and so many days march in the rear, and afterwards founded a retreat? No, certainly; but to shew that the guilty man was known, and marked, orders were immediately given, before they entered France, for the contriver of the mischief to quit the army, and the councils of his royal masters, whose cause he had ruined, by deceiving every party.

Such was the commencement of the miserable history of the present misfortunes of Europe, yet still the arch incendiary enjoys the fire which he has kindled. Calonne immediately took his flight to England, bringing with him *his plans for false assignats, invasions, and his St. Maurice and Moligny*. Engines sufficient to be the instruments of Divine vengeance in any country, consequently they have cost us dear in honour, in blood, and in treasure. The HOW, the WHEN and WHERE, are the subject of those letters to which the author was the more
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immediately led, by seeing that Calonne began writing against his ancient masters, the king's brothers*; for whom and by whom he gave it out, that he had been ruined in his fortune, in that insulting all Europe, and injuring the interests of men whom he ought to have revered and respected†. But Calonne is too deep in the secrets of those whom he has duped, to

* The *Courier de l'Europe* is conducted by the Abbe de Calonne. Those who wish to judge of CONSISTENCY of principle, and ATTACHMENT to the French Princes, may consult that PERIODICAL LIBEL, and De Calonne's publication called, *Le Tableau de l'Europe*.

† It is a fact, easy to be proved by their minister now in London, that neither the king nor his brother owe De Calonne one shilling; but, on the contrary, the balance is greatly against him. Their accounts have been correctly stated by a council appointed for that purpose; therefore, the policy of De Calonne, in attributing his supposed ruin to his royal masters, is easily to be seen through.

Finding himself discarded by the princes, and held in the utmost execration by the respectable body of emigrants, a few of his own underlings and party excepted, he craftily excites pity on account of supposed sacrifices he had made for the cause; but those who have read his anecdotes, or are acquainted with his extravagance and profligacy, well know that no fortune whatever was equal to it.

be deserted by them, and therefore he has their protection, and will keep it ; and were every action ten times blacker than it is, his authority would not insensibly be diminished.

But whether De Calonne, or those who are his protectors, are most reprehensible for the evils which Europe endures, I leave to the opinion of others ; but certain it is, that had ruin and destruction been the grand object, success could not have been better secured than by adopting his pernicious principles—principles repugnant to reason and virtue, and disgraceful to mankind ; his intrigues and dangerous example have united both royalists out of France, and republicans in it, against us. Invasion of territory, horrors of civil war, and the fabrication of false money, are combined against us. The latter calamity, against which the unwary is not armed, we begin to feel. We can bring all these home to De Calonne, and his satellites, who spare nothing to effect what they wish to accomplish.

To

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To write this to Ministers would, perhaps, be useless ; but to the Public at large it may, nay, it soon must be of importance.

EXTRACTS.

EXTRACTS.

From a Narrative which appeared in the French GAZETTE, QUOTIDIENNE, the ORACLE, and the SUNDAY REVIEW, are here inserted, the better to elucidate De Calonne's character and conduct, and to shew that the Author of the following Narrative is not a prejudiced calumniator, but a compiler of facts, connected with, and analogous to this Work.

“THOUGH we first admit the influence which M. De Calonne had on the *destinies of France*, and which he wanted to extend to the fate of all Europe; though we acknowledge that his great genius, the brilliancy of his style, the facility with which he writes, and his extensive knowledge, prove him an able man, we must on the other hand confess, that the *versatility* of his principles and his character, lessen very much the esteem he ought to have gained through such conspicuous qualifications.

“ M. De Calonne being appointed by the late Louis XVI. to administer the Finances, not only avowed himself, during the time of his administration, the public *admirer* and *panegyrist* of the *constitution of the kingdom*—not only re-

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jected the slightest doubt that could be entertained respecting the reality of it—but even founded the claims he made, in the Assembly of the Notables, in favour of the Exchequer, on that *same constitution*; which claims were rejected for that reason.

“ M. De Calonne having been afterwards disgraced, and stripped of the *Cordon du St. Esprit*, or Blue Ribbon, which all the other disgraced ministers were allowed to keep, he fled to England, to avoid an impeachment he dreaded, for having squandered, during his ministry, considerable sums of money, without the King’s approbation or knowledge.

“ At this epoch he learned that the States-General of France were to be convoked, and that a sure means of his being chosen a member was to profess *revolutionary principles*.

“ He then published a Letter, addressed to Louis XVI. in which he set forth, that *France had no constitution*.

“ The Revolution having taken place, M. De Calonne, before he repaired to the court of Turin, from which place he expected to stir up all the Powers of Europe, published his work on *The Present and Future State of France*; and in
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this work he comes back to his former profession of faith, respecting the existence and the excellency of the Political Constitution of France.

“ Disappointed in all his expectations, without the least influence at those courts, he thought he would be able to move at will, and his becoming null in the political world—he once more changed his language and opinion; wrote a book again, purposely to prove that France had no constitution; and exclaimed bitterly against all those who believed the contrary. So that France has a constitution when M. De Calonne is in favour, and has none when he is in disgrace.

“ This simple fact, which admits of no doubt, it being authenticated by diverse writings—that are in the hands of every body, sufficiently prove *the degree of belief that ought to be annexed to M. De Calonne*, and in his last Book, entitled—“ *Tableau de L’Europe;*” a work written in a fit of ill-humour, totally destitute of solid reasoning and decorum, in a style loaded with ridiculous antitheses; in which, instead of the gravity that should characterize a former minister, one only finds the levity, and gaiety, and even the buffoonery of those scribblers who take Voltaire for their model.”

Another

Another from the ORACLE, July 1796.

“ TO M. DE CALONNE.

“ Since my last, perceiving that there are numbers of your own countrymen, who have set to work upon your private character and past life, I shall leave the department which they have taken entirely to their care, and shall only examine your revolutionary conduct.

“ In England, it is true, you are at liberty to write against the French Monarchy if you will. You are at liberty to write against Louis XVIII. if you think proper to do so; and may even set up for the general critic, the reprover, and the self-created minister of all Europe. If you have not something *within* that will prevent you, I know of nothing external that can.

“ You give, indeed, a very bad specimen of the ancient court of France, when you shew that even now, at the age of seventy, having provoked a very serious contest by your own writings, you cannot reply to your adversaries but by scurrilous and low attempts at wit, which sin as much against taste and genius as they do against decorum and propriety.

“ You are accused, Sir, of attacking the principles of him whom you call your master. You
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are accused of endeavouring to shew that he has no right to be King of France, and that he does not deserve to become a king!! Yes, Sir, you have said, that there was no ancient constitution in France, and therefore Madame Royale, and not Monsieur Count de Provence, ought to reign. You have again said, that the declaration of Monsieur was founded upon wrong principles. If so, he neither has an hereditary nor a meritorious title.

“ This, Sir, you are accused of having said, and yet you answer by a species of light jargon that would scarcely have been excusable had the quarrel originated in the lobby of the Opera House about a courtesan.

“ Is it possible, Sir, that the world has been so far deceived, as to suppose you to be a man of TASTE, OF DISCERNMENT, OR OF JUDGMENT? You who mistake ribaldry for wit, injurious language for argument, and abuse lavished on your master, in the face of all Europe, for real service.

“ During the contest between Britain and America, there was a man who played a very singular part. You must have heard of that man—Silas Deane espoused the cause of his countrymen in America, at first with great energy and disinterestedness,

terestedness, and by some unaccountable *bezar-
rerrie*, he abandoned their cause just before their
ultimate success. The talents and disinterested-
ness of the patriot were all foiled under the
ignominy of the *turn-coat*; and the master of
thousands, which he had lavished to save and to
serve his country, perished in London in indi-
gence, *disregarded* and *despised*.

“ Such, Sir, is, and indeed ought to be the fate
of men, who, after having embarked with a party
in political discords, abandon their friends. I
do not speak of the party squabbles that are for
honours or for places; such squabbles I con-
sider as the play of children, but I speak of those
where the lives and fortunes of thousands of
innocents are at stake; and there I do not
think that there is any punishment sufficiently
severe for those who, guided by their *private in-
terests*, change sides as they see convenient, at the
risque and peril of their country.

“ You will, perhaps, say, Sir, that you did not
change nor intend to change; I should be glad
to think so, but I cannot. Are you or Louis
XVIII. to be the master and the leader, that
after he has spoken, you dare to contradict him?
Or if you were still his adherent, would you
hear with levity and carelessness, the heavy
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charge brought against you of having abandoned him. No, Sir, you would shudder, and not laugh at the accusation.

“ Again, Sir, if you neither changed, nor meant to change, how comes it that you have written in so unintelligible a language, that every one has mistaken your meaning? Surely your own countrymen, though they are Emigrants, still understand French; and if they do—and if we do, who have gone to France to learn it, before indeed it had acquired all the improvements which the revolutionary heroes have invented; you are no longer actuated by that spirit which *you assumed*, and which assembled the legions of the Princes at Coblenz, when you were the chief cornerstone of that baseless edifice.

“ *Ambitious men resemble each other in the leading points*—La Fayette would never have headed the Revolution, if he could have risen to power in the ancient order of things.—La Fayette ordered his master to be stopt at Varennes, and led in ignominy to Paris.—La Fayette was his gaoler till the time came for him to deliver over his keys to his successor in office, Santerre; and then La Fayette, who could no longer rule, conspired.

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He would then have persuaded his injured master to return to Varennes, to quit the kingdom; but though his unfortunate master did not see into futurity, he remembered what was past, and indignantly refused to run away a second time with the connivance of a faithless friend.

“No longer his keeper, La Fayette, wished the king to escape.—No longer an *adviser*, you became an *adversary*, and shew the world at large, that world which pays with its *blood* and *treasure* for the *ambition of such men as you*, that when a leader of parties, to rule was your only end; and the means, whatever was found most ready and most convenient.

“There is only one good that can result from the political lectures with which you now favour Europe; and that all good men join in wishing for most ardently—That Louis XVIII. whether he remains an expatriated king, with no other inheritance but his courage, his patience, and his virtue, or ascends the throne of his ancestors, will never listen to the councils of a Calonne, nor allow him either by his presence to embitter his adversity nor degrade his throne.”

DESCRIPTION

PRELIMINARY

TO

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1792;

AND DESCRIPTION OF

DE CALONNE AND ST. MORYS.

AFTER Calonne's *disgrace* and *banishment* from France, he found all those intrigues fail which he had alternately played off upon the *Royal* and *Revolutionary* Parties, and saw no probability of his being again received in that country, either under the shape of an Aristocrat or a Democrat. He found also, that the different powers which he attempted to stir up to mischief viewed all his intrigues with contempt, as the efforts of a desperate man, actuated by *revenge* and *despair*; and whose principles changed according to times and circumstances.

At this epoch Monsieur DE CALONNE is publicly accused of having set his fertile genius to work, and employed his great resources (*which he afterwards pretended were sacrificed for the cause of the French Princes*) to hurry on the Revolution

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which soon after burst out; very justly calculating that some of the distracted *parties* would consider him as an acquisition, and that he would then figure in the *general commotion*.

The early emigration of the Count D'ARTOIS, the CONDE family, the Marechal Duke of BROGLIO, and the higher order of the Court Party, was a propitious event for CALONNE, as it threw many of his former enemies into his own state of exile, which would soon procure him an opportunity to display his superior talents, and to become the chief engine in their future operations.

His first essay amongst the exiles, was planning the *Counter Revolution*, which, under his *wise* and *prudent* Government, was as *expeditiously* to be *executed*.

The Electors of Cologne and Treves being nearly related to the Court of France, and that country being the most contiguous, CALONNE proposed the general rendezvous to be made at Coblentz, and there assumed the functions of Minister to the King of France, declared the Court held at Coblentz to be the only legitimate Court of Louis XVI. and the orders of the council, he there appointed, were those which
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alone were to be respected. He sent his minions into France, to raise a panic amongst the nobility that remained in the country; stating, that all those Noblesse who did not repair with their followers to the royal standard at Coblentz, would be disgraced, and considered as disaffected to the Crown.

This manœuvre produced an effect singular to relate, and can only be compared to the holy crusaders, for its diversity of warriors. For a considerable time the principal people of France, with their followers, flocked to Germany, striving who should arrive first, and trembling lest the *Contre Revolution* should be *begun* and *finished* without them*.

* The dread of *dishonour*, *confiscation*, and *general attainder*, made so powerful an impression, that the roads every where were lined with old and young of both sexes: the *panic* was so well kept up, even in their way through the Netherlands and Germany, that they dreaded arriving too late, and many from despair actually destroyed themselves. At Aix la Chapelle two noblemen blew out their brains, and three drowned themselves in the Rhine. Several who could not find means to quit France did the same: it was only when they got to Coblentz, that they found the rumours of an army arose from that place were exaggerated, though being the general rendezvous, it was a continued crowd and confusion. It was afterwards with these very people, so artfully decoyed from home, that one of the finest cavalcades ever seen before in Europe, was formed, and that at their own expence.

This laid the foundation of their *own ruin*—the *destruction* of *their cause*—and the *death* of *their king*.

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The chief of DE CALONNE's emissaries in France, to bring about these events, was one St. MORYS, a relation, a *disgraced Advocate of Paris*—who had haunted him during his former administration. St. MORYS, though an obscure character in the great world, was an *arch* and *crafty minion*, capable of every *execrable action* for the *sake of gain*; he was as dexterous in pushing the horrible plans of his associate, as he was cruel and sanguinary in executing *his own*; he was a pillager of every public or private charge with which he was ever intrusted. St. MORYS having succeeded in all his missions for DE CALONNE, in France, rejoined that *virtuous* Minister at Coblenz, and became his coadjutor under the denomination of Comptroller of Finance. St. MORYS had under him a minion, his own brother, called le Chevalier de MOLIGNY, a mean man and obedient tool, and a subaltern in the Police Guards, who also came to Coblenz. With equal abhorrence and astonishment did every independant Royalist view the political and military arrangements carried on under these two usurpers, who also filled every subordinate department by their own satellites. Indeed it might naturally appear strange, how a man should be trusted, whose *bad conduct* and *dilapidations* in France, had so very recently excited the curiosity of all Europe, and the hatred of the French nation, even whilst the

the remembrance was still fresh of the very exemplary manner in which the King had disgraced him (with his *own hand*,) previous to his banishment. This excited the greater astonishment, that Monsieur LE BARON DE BRETTEUL (the real minister to the King) and many other statesmen of great judgment and approved integrity, stood by, blushing at the farce which was to precede the tragedy they predicted, inevitably to plunge monarchy farther into the labyrinth than ever, and to destroy the only means by which it was to be restored; but few were acquainted with the invisible chain by which the deluded Princes were held.

It was here, and from this epoch, the unfortunate situation of the Princes has been most sensibly felt. The artifices of these two intriguers found means to embarrass the Princes, and lay them under pecuniary obligations, so as to preclude every intervention against them. DE CALONNE, in the first instance, certainly made them real advantages in specie; but St. MORYS set about an early *fabrication of false Assignats*, under the specious pretext of defraying the *expence of raising an army*, with which CALONNE went on, advancing sums to the Princes, pretending it was the result of his own credit and his wife's fortune, and thereby *augment their debts* and

and *obligations to himself*. The many nefarious purposes to which St. MORYS also applied the false assignats for his own use, has brought upon the Princes more obloquy upon the continent, than all their other misfortunes, and which every where continues to pursue and humiliate them.

Although it has been admitted that De Calonne made some real advances for the supposed use of the French Princes, yet, it is well understood, that the great bulk of his sacrifices had been previously applied to hurry on the *rupture in France*, and to excite the general emigration, as that event alone could ever recal him from exile. Besides it is notorious that the revenues of the state could scarcely support the extravagant libertine, and scandalous style which Calonne regularly supported during his administration, which forms the most calamitous epoch in the history of profligate ministers. There are volumes in every language replete with De Calonne's extraordinary anecdotes upon that head. Therefore, when we review the train he kept up at Coblentz, and the *means he had of doing it*, it is easy to be imagined, that he reimbursed himself through his colleague St. Morys, who, previous to his coming to Coblentz, had given specimens of his great dexterity in *forging and counterfeiting*.

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St. Morys was one of the first engravers in Europe, to which art he applied himself more than to the study of the law; he had been detected in imitating the plates to make assignats before he left Paris, and his brother was allowed to be the most dexterous imitator of the signatures.

As to the coining money and forging false paper at Coblantz, the Princes spurned at the idea—but they were overpowered by the crafty arguments of these two interested men, who forcibly urged, that the assignats made by the French nation were spurious, and the sole right of making royal money belonged to them, besides, it was to be employed for the use and service of the King, restricted as he then was in his regal privileges.

Situated as the unfortunate Princes were between these two men, what were they to do? They were not permitted to reflect for an instant on future consequences. The one had only to propose, what the other (*in the name of the King, and by order of the Princes*) was sure to consent to, and in the like manner they arrogated to themselves every *authority* and distinguished place, civil and military.

St. Morys being Comptroller of the Finances, and De Calonne the Prime Minister, their relations

tions and creatures only were suffered to fill the principal and subordinate offices. Pleasure and luxury, equal to those of a splendid Eastern Monarch, were seemingly the chief study in each of their departments—and they became competitors for pre-eminence and grandeur; and strange to tell, the levees of these two usurpers of power were far more brilliant and ceremonious (*each at their respective hotels*) than were those of the Princes.

During this display of luxury and magnificence, it was thought necessary for the better supporting St. Morys dignity, that all his family should also become great men. His son, *a boy of eighteen, just come from school*, must have a wife, and was instantly doubly allied to De Calonne, by marrying his niece (*Mademoiselle de Vallicourt*); then he must be made a NOBLEMAN. Old *Qui Tam*, with his treasure in *Germany*, found no difficulty in that; and he became the *soi-disant* Comte de Carrier. Thus provided with a wife and a title, and so fine a prospective of wealth, nothing remained to exalt this nobleman but to make him *a great officer*; for that purpose a regiment was instantly to be provided for him, but as assignats alone could not effect this last requisite, in an instant, it was necessary to have recourse to violence upon the property of others,

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which the two illustrious statesmen, his father and uncle, never were at a loss how to put in execution. An attack was made at the same time upon two colonels of regiments*, both were thrown into prison, charged *with treasonable correspondence*, and after various cruelties exercised upon them, both were obliged to submit, and thus two regiments fell to intriguers, and St. Moryst† got one; no wonder then, with such despotic *sway*, and such *riches*, invested in such men as De Calonne and St. Morys, that the splendour was proportionate towards the end of their *farce* at Coblenz.

* Comte De Wilkenstien and Colonel Sinclair.

† Afterwards distinguished in the army by the title of the Sucking Colonel; his uncle, Moligni, a short time before only Lieutenant of the Police Guards, was also, upon the ruins of Sinclair, made Colonel Commandant. The rest of the officers of this corps became equally distinguished, (not for their signal services before the enemy) but under Calonne, in his false assignat speculation. From General La Charee, down to the Sub-lieutenants, all were his tools and proteges. The regiment was honoured with being the guard to the paper manufactory. La Charee, under the pretext of being its inspector, was the inspector to the fabric of assignats, in which every officer also had his working department to attend, besides his duty in the corps.

KEY TO THE CAMPAIGN

IN

CHAMPAIGNE, 1792.

THE great movement and emigration which Calonne agitated, furnished him with the very best credentials with which to impose upon the different powers openly favourable to the cause. He represented to the court of Peterburgh, that it was with difficulty the *greatest part of France* were prevented from joining the princes; that great parties were ready to assemble in France, to favour the operations without; that Alsace and Lorrain were ready to come over to the princes; that the governor of Strasbourg was to give up that fortress; and that *Normandy* was also ready to assemble, and only waited for arms, on which side of France the diversion would be most propitious to the giving up the fortresses upon the German frontiers. This was artfully corroborated by the written reports which his own hirelings sent him from most parts in France, whither he had sent them for that purpose. He then very plausibly urged the great necessity of
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having supplies of money, with which to provide the requisite armaments, subsistence, &c. Whether these supplies came directly from Russia, or were the joint contributions of the two empires, or principally *from England*, I will hereafter throw more light upon:—in the mean time I only observe, that at this very time young Mr. Burke, and a certain Earl's son, had secret commissions from England to Coblentz, upon money affairs.

De Calonne so well carried on his pretended correspondence and negociations with the different garrisons and frontier fortresses, that the princes and council literally believed him. The Emigrants, as fast as they arrived, impatiently flocked to see the minister, admiring him as something more than mortal. It was really a farce to see the ladies too, fainting and dying with impatience, to see and pay their homage to the *dear, amiable, and divine De Calonne*, their saviour, and for ever to be their idol, &c. &c. Such lavished flattery and encomiums, were really enough, at that juncture, to make a man much less weak and ambitious than himself, lose his senses; and no doubt but in his own mind he believed himself to be possessed of what he so frequently heard repeated of his worth and merits, his greatness and goodness, &c. His flatter-
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tering and fawning partizans made him believe that all France were disposed to think as favourably of him as they did.

Certain it is, that at that time prodigious sums were received at the Princes treasury;—and it is also certain, that many of the higher order of Emigrants advanced large sums for the Princes. We may moderately state the Princes army at 50,000 men. The Inspector-General, Schoenfeldt, sent on the part of Prussia to regulate the accounts of the army, declared that funds had been provided for raising an army, and for the subsistence of the Emigrants, allowing them each 2s. 6d. per day; and he was petrified when he was assured, that not any one corps of these noble volunteers had received one shilling; nor was any of the army raised, or subsisted, at the expence of the Princes, except about six regular corps, and the King's guards.—What became of the immense sums sent for the use of that army, was not only the astonishment of Russia and Prussia, but produced the most pointed dissatisfaction of the different courts, which in the end operated to the prejudice of the Princes, and to the injury of their cause—as they were innocently accused as being parties in the extravagance.

General

General Schoenfeldt, at the head of whose staff the author had in a former war been, declared to him, and several other superior officers, “ *That he was shocked and ashamed to transmit the accounts to Berlin, which exceeded all imagination; and declared, that the whole of the revenues of Prussia were not equal to the dilapidations.*”

De Calonne endeavoured to account for the great expenditure, under the head of *extraordinaries*, employed to keep alive the *spirit of royalty in France*, to encourage *emigration*, to bribe and buy over parties in the National Assembly, and more particularly distributed in the different provinces to excite counter revolutionary assemblies. This last article was refuted by the Emigrants, who, on the contrary, had individually contributed amongst themselves to defray such expences.—These caused an enquiry to be set on foot, but it was not deemed a proper time to vex Calonne by going on with it, and he found it no difficult matter to *hush up, and stifle*:—but from thence, the beginning of June, 1792, General Schoenfeldt superintended the expenditure of the Princes army, so that De Calonne and his underlings had a very attentive watch and check over them.—This had one effect, which ruined thousands of respectable merchants in Germany. Mr. Boipoil and his colleagues, the negociators of the false assignats,

assignats, were set to work sooner than it was at first intended, to make their grand stroke. De Calonne began to perceive his career was verging towards its end, without he could bring about some extraordinary events, to corroborate what he had asserted as to the disposition of the different departments of France, and the fortresses to be given up.

It was asserted at the time, that he really had correspondence with all the places he mentioned; but it also turned out, that that *correspondence* did not extend farther than with his own hirelings, whom he had sent to each place for that purpose.

The King of Prussia and Duke of Brunswick arrived in July; when De Calonne, with great confidence, and his usual plausibility, entered into explanations and discussions with the Prussian Council of War; displayed all the preparatives he had made for their kind reception in France, and the giving up Longwy, Thionville, Metz, &c. &c. and the march to Paris was open and uninterrupted. He positively averred, that the different commandants of those places were engaged to him to give them up;—that it would only be necessary for the Prussians to present themselves before each, and to make every
 necessary

necessary preparation for a siege, and even vigorously attack some, in order to justify the commandants, to deceive the soldiers, and the National Assembly:—he even went so far as to produce papers and messengers, which he pretended to have come directly from General *Felix Wimpfen*, the commandant of Thionville.

However much prejudice ran against De Calonne, for his singular squandering away money, appearances from these details were, nevertheless, much in his favour;—and there was certainly a great probability at the time, that the very tremendous name of Prussian, at the head of the allies, would alone have opened the barriers of all the frontiers—in which case De Calonne and his tricks would have passed undetected. The Duke of Brunswick, in consequence of this deception, issued his famous manifesto, dated 25th July, 1792, at Coblenz.

The allies assembled in the Electorate of Treves, and Dutchy of Luxembourg, in the middle of August.

The king of Prussia in person, reviewed the Princes army, on the 12th August, on the plains of Treves:—and as it was ordered that the Emigrants were always to be kept several days in the rear of the allies; not to operate with them but
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in case of real emergency, they remained in the old Prussian camp, at Konz, near Treves, until the Austrians and Prussians had, in Calonne's terms, presented themselves before Longwy, on the 22d, which place, without hardly any resistance, surrendered on the 23d.

This easy conquest made things appear favourable for Calonne; but, alas! it was only an illusive hope for him, the allies, and more so for the deceived Princes.—On the 24th, General Hohenloe's army encamped before Thionville, made their approaches, perhaps, in too confidential a manner, relying upon Wimphen's supposed treaty to De Calonne; but the garrison opened such a tremendous fire, after the first six days preparation for the siege, that they drove the Austrians into confusion, killed numbers of their troops, and shattered the army of the General Prince De Waldeck *. It was on this occasion that Calonne's deceptions were discovered. The governor was summoned to surrender, according to *the pretended* secret engagements; a parley was requested; he was accused of murdering troops, and acting in a treacherous manner, contrary to the laws of carrying on war. Wimphen explained, and exculpated himself. The commandants of
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* The Emigrants, then camped and cantoned in the Dutchy of Luxembourg, were suffered to advance to Etange, on the 31st, and assisted in the operations of the siege.

all the other fortresses, confirmed what Wimphen had answered, each for their respective places.

The king of Prussia found himself in a most critical situation, without any magazines whatever, even for ten days, and to wait and form magazines, would have took up the remainder of the campaign. He found his plan of operation entirely defeated. Disgust, and ill-founded suspicion, fell upon the deceived Emigrants; they were kept farther at a distance, supposing them capable of treachery to the succouring allies; and from thence we may date the harsh and cruel treatment they experienced from the Prussians, during the remainder of that disastrous campaign: But De Calonne was marked as the real author of the mischief, and was ignominiously driven from the Princes council, and the army, before Thionville, about the 8th of September.

The author of this narrative had a very peculiar method of knowing these events, and some secret operations; not only from his frequent conferences with the Prussian General Schoenfeldt, who regulated every operation of the Princes army, but through his old comrade the general's first aid-de-camp, who did not hesitate to anticipate every thing that happened to that unfortunate army of the Princes—which enabled him fre-

quently to communicate with the marshal Duc de Broglie.

The unexpected resistance which the fortresses and the armies seemed to indicate would be opposed to the Duke of Brunswick, stagnated every necessary movement, during twelve days, from the surrender of Longwy, to that of Verdun, on the 3d of September; the latter did not even give occupation to the Prussian *avant garde*; they did not take any one precaution to prevent destruction to an army entering into an enemy's country.—They certainly no longer had confidence in De Calonne's former fabulous representations: and seeing them advance by deliberate marches, no one suspected their neglecting those requisites, which, in all former wars, the Prussians so carefully observed:—First, judicious depots of magazines.—Secondly, posts so taken up as to secure the flanks and rear of the army, and to protect the line of convoys, the strength and life of an army;—and, Thirdly, to dispossess the enemy of strong positions upon the flanks, which might prove fatal in case of a retreat:—every one of these precautions were neglected.

The Duke thus advanced with his Prussians, leaving the Austrians under Clairfayt, and the Hessians, who formed the second line, several days in

in the rear; a small army, under the Prince Hohenloe, at Thionville, and the royal emigrant army several days, by slow and impeded marches, in the rear of the whole allies,—and thus kept distant from the operations of the armies, on account, as was stated, to prevent the arduous impetuosity of the Emigrants, in pursuing individual revenge and cruelties—which the Duke considered himself bound by the tenour of his manifesto to prevent.

The royal princes patiently complied with the humiliating terms imposed upon them; instead of being detached to bring over the whole army of La Fayette, just abandoned by the desertion of that general and his staff, the soldiers admonished their officers in the royal army to come and command, or to be suffered to join the Princes. As this could not be attended to but by the consent of the Duke, commander in chief, it, like the foregoing advantages, also fell to the ground; and that army was instantly rallied by Dumourier, with which he very judiciously manœuvred before the invading enemy, and by disputing every post and position, he reduced their strength, and augmented his own, in proportion as he fell back, to decoy them farther up the country.

All

All that attention to good order recommended to the Emigrant army, was very contrary to the strange discipline observed by the Prussians. The Duke's *avant gard* spread horror and alarm wherever it went, from the first day of crossing the frontiers till they arrived in the fatal camp de la Lune, where near a third of his army were left victims to their excesses and depredations, which threw their bodies into a contaminated state. Whether the conduct of the Prussian soldiers was acting in conformity to the Duke's manifesto, the poor French peasants can give the best account, were they to be consulted upon that subject. There was no cruelty whatever that an invading enemy can be capable of, but what was attributed to the Prussian soldiers; the general hue and cry was spread for all that could move to save themselves by flight: What could be the cause of such cruel indiscipline is inconceivable, for had invention been set to work to reverse the object expressed in the Duke's manifesto, sure it is, they could not have better succeeded than they did.

Thus the Prussians arrived in Champaign diseased, and carrying horror and detestation with them; instead of being any where joined by the people, the farther they advanced the greater became

became the prospect of famine; leaving so many fortresses in the rear filled with troops, the difficulty of receiving their convoys daily augmented—and as to foraging in the country, it was impossible, every thing moveable being carried away, the villages were deserted, not a person able to move remained, the only spectators we beheld were here and there cripples; and as to horses, cattle, sheep, or poultry of any kind, not one head was to be seen in any one village where the Prussians had passed.

The want of regular supplies, and hunger, suggested to them many expedients to discover secreted effects and provisions.

With their bayonets they ransacked dung-hills, gardens, plowed-fields, and out-houses; and where they succeeded in finding food of any sort, the immoderate quantity which they devoured, soon brought on that violent disorder the dysentery, which proved so fatal to the Prussians in particular.

I remember seeing them feasting upon a large depot they had discovered in a garden, consisting of bacon, hogs-lard, dirty grease for the carts, and potatoes. They devoured every thing *raw*, like so many cannibals; upon this they drank all
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the brandy and wine they could find ; the weather setting in so extremely wet, and in a country where no cover or straw could be got to lay upon, no wonder then that they became so diseased.

The superior system of discipline, however, of the Austrian soldiers, their temperance and moderation, saved them from the like disasters, they remained perfectly healthy, and performed prodigies of valour, both in advancing at Grand-pré, and in the retreat which they covered—whilst the Prussians flew on all sides, in the only action they had during the campaign, which was against Dumourier on the 21st, and they dropped in numbers during the retreat, beyond all idea that can be conceived by those who were not eye witnesses.

It is certain the Prussians did not lose 600 men in that campaign, killed by the enemy ; yet by the returns after the retreat, their army was diminished 6000 men. After the armies were led to the desert plains of Champagne, and there remaining thirteen days in inaction, during which time the Duke of Brunswick and Dumourier carried on a negociation, which will be hereafter described, the shameful retreat was ordered. The Comte D'Artois and General Clairfayt,

Clairfayt, thunder struck, hoped by their representations and offers, to exempt the Prussians from participating danger, to get the order reversed, went to the King and Duke's camp, who were deaf to remonstrances. To the Comte D'Artois the King of Prussia harshly said, "*he had been grossly deceived, and that he would remember it to (the princes) and emigrants, to the last hour of his existence**." This was a severe sentence to that afflicted prince; supposing even he had in any manner been implicated in the duplicity of De Calonne; which by his subsequent resentment to him, proves he was also his dupe, and now suffers on that account with the rest of his victims.

The Prussians soon after exercised a barbarity upon the Emigrants which cannot be conceived or accounted for; even the enemy, from the recitals, spurned at it.

It was astonishing in so short a time as one month, that the name of a Prussian should have suffered such a change in the minds of all ranks of people. When they first entered France, every eye viewed them with that awe and respect which their former reputation, when under the

* These harsh sentiments (if true they were uttered) have been construed as if they were intended to serve as an excuse for what his Majesty knew was to happen.

Great Frederic, merited: every where their praises were sung, as *conquering heroes*, the *restorers of peace* and *good order*, &c. &c. But their *excesses*, their *disorderly conduct*, the *cruelties and outrages* they everywhere committed upon the poor villagers, and the unhuman manner they despoiled the Emigrant army, even to the pillaging of the afflicted French princes, and *their own sovereign's baggage*; these, with their disgraceful behaviour before the enemy on the 21st September, rendered them equally detestable and despicable, and brought on them the execrations of all that beheld them, Austrians, Emigrants, and the enemy.

On the retreat, during very shocking weather, the Prussians were in a most miserable plight, the roads and fields, on all sides, were strewed with their carcases; and while they were dying, they were loaded with bitter execrations. Every one, on the contrary, looked with veneration and esteem on the Austrians, with whom they would have shared the last shilling.

These distinctions were not founded in prejudice or injustice; and it is a fact not to be disputed, that had Clairfayt been invested with the command, his master the Emperor, being interested to conquer, and not to enter into any political plan, which has nearly overturned all Europe,

Europe, the royal family of France would have (it is probable) been reinstated soon after, and a final period put to anarchy.

When the cause of the Princes had thus turned out unfortunate, and their persons were arrested at Aix la Chapelle, on their way to Germany, for a debt which originated in false assignats, St. Morys, who had followed the army with his fictitious treason, which he had been negotiating by force in France, was no longer a friend to the unfortunate, but deserted them in distress, refusing even to join in security for the paltry sum of £.500, but fled to England with the plunder, there again rejoined his faithful colleague De Calonne, who had influence enough (in this country) to recommend and push forward his own virtuous creature, to execute different strange political operations (under him) the principal in the Quiberon expedition.

OPINIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

OF

THE AUTHOR

UPON THE

CAMPAIGN IN CHAMPAIGNE.

I Do not intend to impute to De Calonne's ridiculous administration, his duplicity and lies, all those disastrous events which so soon after succeeded on the plains of Champagne; nor will I presume to affirm, that a certain great political plan had previously been made, and *originated with a great commercial nation; viz. to destroy France, its commerce, manufactures, and navy, its dangerous intrigues and politics, by the revolution; and not to suffer the Emigrants to destroy a revolution, which was to effect so great a purpose!* Had that great nation succeeded in the plans that have cost her so dear in honour, blood, and treasure, had she been able to stop the career of the republicans at will,

will, as was vainly believed; that commercial nation, this day, would have been the greatest in the universe, and her ministers for ever immortalized; whereas the reverse having happened, through arrogance, ostentation, and ignorance, that nation is verging upon misery, and her ministers to the rewards due to their labours.

In my humble opinion, as a military man, who may be supposed to have some small degree of practical knowledge, from experience in several continental wars, the Duke of Brunswick was guilty of two egregious errors; and I am farther confirmed in that opinion, from various conversations I have since had with Dumourier, and several of the Prussian and French Generals; that his Grace had more troops under his command, upon his arrival on the frontiers, than were necessary to effect a counter-revolution, had nothing happened to give a colour of not employing them to the best advantage.

First, then, upon his finding himself imposed upon by the fabulous representations
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of the Princes minister, he should have lost no time in regularly besieging the first and second line of the fortified places—*Thionville*, *Montmidy*, and *Sedan*, which, in the first instant, would inevitably fall as easy into their hands as did *Longwhy*, between the 20th and 24th of August, in which he could have employed the whole of the Prussian, Austrian, and Hessian troops; and to have sent the *Emigrant army*, under the royal Princes, *to either attack, or to receive*, the submission of the whole of *La Fayette's* division; which was at that very time in the greatest consternation, on account of the desertion of the general, and all its principal officers, which would have rendered them an acquisition upon any terms; by that method, both provisions, and an uninterrupted line of march for regular operations, besides a safe retreat in case of need, was secured.

Or, Secondly, The Duke ought to have pushed forward the Prussians, by double marches, as far as *Chalon*, instead of losing so much time, from the 15th August to the 3d September, upon the frontiers between
Longwhy

Longwhy and Verdun ; at Chalon he would have secured all the magazines, sufficient to winter the whole army in case of a defeat, and concentrated his combined forces in a country esteemed the granary of France.

The Comte De Clairfayt, with the Austrians and Hessians, should then have followed rapidly upon the Duke's rear, Longwhy, and Verdun ceding as they did without opposition—and to have employed the Emigrants, as I have just stated, whose success would have been as certain as that of the Prussians and Austrians ; nay, I have even been assured by the Marshal Duke de Broglie, the whole army of La Fayette had sent deputations to the Princes, *imploring to be permitted to join*, or to send their ancient generals to command them under the royal standard. The Emigrant army, from its superior composition in men and horses, unincumbered, and animated as they were by their zeal and interest in the cause in which their whole was at stake ; by their marches would have moved with such velocity, as to have arrived on the plains of St. Denis with
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their conquering army, as soon as the Prussians could have done ; but, no ! the Princes were not allowed to act, or to be within six days march of the primitive movements !

Every military man, of any capacity, must see the truth of these assertions ; and my opinion is from ocular demonstration, that the Duke, in neglecting these extraordinary advantages, left himself exposed to all the destructive calamities which afterwards befel him and the cause. Had the Duke only suffered the Emigrant army at that favourable moment to act, and followed his own heavy march,—what might not have been expected, as the whole of the French armies were then disorganized ? Confusion and disorder everywhere prevailed, terror and consternation would have spread like wild fire, and the undisciplined national guards would have fled on all sides ; but that fine opportunity was suffered to pass by—Dumourier was permitted to arrive from his command in the north ; and in ten days rallied 40,000 men, most of whom would have otherwise been with the royal army. Kellerman with 12,000, and Bournonville and
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La Bourdonaye, with their fatigued armies, from long and double marches, were allowed to reinforce Dumourier; and Luckner to form a strong depot of national guards at Chalon. Thus every avenue was shut, which in a few days so totally changed the face of affairs, that had it been the wishes of the Duke it could not have succeeded better.

I cannot see any admissible reason for the Duke, as a known great general, acting as he did, in advancing into the country, contrary to every *known* principle of war; neither do I conceive he is justified in his excuse, of having been deceived by the Princes minister; he must have known that the obstacles in receiving his convoys, would inevitably force his retreat, which necessarily would become, at least, *disorderly* and irregular, from being assailed on all directions by the armies he had imprudently left behind. The conquests he had already made, of *Longwy*, and *Verdun*, were rendered void, and every prospect of taking up winter quarters in France was destroyed, in case of any disaster happening.

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I am ready to admit, that upon the Duke finding himself so grossly deceived by an arch imposture, that *disgust* and *distrust* very violently operated to the prejudice of the Princes and whole body of Emigrants, which accounts, in some degree, for the singular brutality with which the Prussians treated them. But, in my mind, notwithstanding the formidable enemy and their position, there was yet time, even in Champagne, to remedy the ills complained of.

Dumourier's army as yet undisciplined, and harraßed by long marches, had till then been everywhere beaten, nor had they recovered from the panic which Clairfayt had struck, on the 14th, at Grandpré.

Dumourier has since declared that he dreaded an attack, even in his strong position on arriving at St. Menoul; that his whole attention was directed to inspire courage in his troops, and to punish the panic struck, by cutting off their hair, stripping them, and flogging them out of his army. How different then was the situation

tion of the Emigrants; there was not a man who did not burn to attack, nor one who could have been a coward; 12,000 cavalry of that description, mounted and armed as they were, were equal to any force.—And I am well persuaded from ocular demonstration, as I was stationed often at the advanced posts, where I had an opportunity of knowing the disposition of the enemy; that had the proposition of the Comte D'Artois been acceded to, victory would have been the result.

The Comte D'Artois and General Clairfayt, when ordered to retreat from Champagne, went to the King of Prussia's and Duke of Brunswick's camp, and used every argument to prevent the retreat; Comte Clairfayt requested only that the Prussians would draw up in order of battle, to make an appearance in the front, but at a respectable distance from Dumourier; that he would attack with the Austrians, and the Comte D'Artois gallantly offered to turn Dumourier with his noble cavaliers. Had that been adopted, Dumourier has since

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admitted

admitted he must have been defeated, and unable to rally his army. It is probable a carnage might have taken place in the noble cavalry, but no comparison can be made between it and that which they would have made with their enemy; besides, every man was ready prepared, and preferred it to the disgraceful and baneful retreat. There is no doubt but they would have succeeded, when we look to what advantage they have fought since, against intrepid and violent republicans—they even had nothing to do but to gain one battle, drive Dumourier out of his strong position; one league more territory the Duke would have been in a plentiful country, abounding with every requisite to resist any force, where he could recruit and refresh his army—he would likewise have been in a position to cut off every assistance that Paris could derive from the army.

But, no! That great event was not to take place! Why? because that would have been a manœuvre *destructive* to the political plan agreed on. And though victory was holding out her propitious hand,
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and the easy purchase was so certain, that the Duke of Brunswick would have been immortalized; and the most modern monarch in Europe would have gained a laurel unparalleled even in ancient history, by rescuing with his *own hand* a virtuous king out of his chains, immured in his own capital; and above all, by re-establishing the most ancient and illustrious throne in the *world*, as also the most extensive superior order of men and things, had the *ingenuity of the great, great cabinet general*, not been employed in a different way, and prevented the direct method of conquering France, by an indirect method of *destroying it*.

The poor Emigrants were submissive in the rules prescribed for them; they were not even *individually* allowed to approach within certain limits of the Prussian armies, (probably it was to prevent acquiring an *ingenious method of pillaging and spreading alarm*.)

They were conducted to the desert wide plains of Champaign Pouleuse, and there to
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linger in inaction, and to starve; deprived of every species of sustenance, except the refuse of the disorderly despoilers who had preceded them.

If there really did exist a great political plan to new modelize the two extremities of Europe, the question was, by whom was the downfall of *France* and *Poland* to be carried into execution; of course none in Europe was so fit for the diabolical plan, as he who had so recently given a specimen of his principles, in exciting the revolt in Holland and the Netherlands, and who so dexterously profited by it. Speculations in the East Indies are regularly bartered upon the Exchange of London, and those in which the King of Prussia was engaged to negotiate for, (relative to France,) has proved to have been liquidated in Polish domains, without counting the *English specie which accelerated his acquisition*. We need but look into the political system of that *recent* monarchy. It has ever been the system of Prussia to interfere with the quarrels of her neighbours, and in the scramble to enlarge her

her territories ; it was not very difficult, by the influence of a *triple alliance*, to subtilize an inexperienced Imperial power, interested to frustrate a plan, had it either been suggested or seen through at ever so great a distance, not only from those relative feelings towards his own blood, but because the richest jewel in the Imperial crown opposed the unreasonable sacrifice. Therefore the King of Prussia, who had nothing to risque at that great distance ; but who had great acquisitions to gain in Poland, as they were held out as a temptation to him ! was very easily led to join in a foreign quarrel, which no more concerned him than any other distant prince of the Empire. The temptation held out relative to Poland was too great for him to withstand, therefore his allies, to compensate his good offices, in pretending to reinstate *one* sovereign, gave him the means to take down the crown of *another* ; and by that dexterous aid it is clear, that he aimed at destroying them both. A contrary conduct to that which the Emigrants were permitted to pursue in Champagne, would have effected a counter-revolution,

revolution, by the hands of that royal party, who would have been instantly enabled to prescribe such laws as even the co-operating armies must have been forced to subscribe to. Therefore it was leading their powers into such a situation, alone, that could have possibly given the *coup de gras* to the royal rendezvous, and assembly of Emigrants.

To starve the belly was the only requisite generalship; and double the number of the enemy, with all the bombastic talents of Dumourier, could not have done the same. To destroy France, and to annihilate those envious machinations of intrigue, too prevalent at the court of Versailles, and so often fatal to the commercial part of Europe, was no more than what was to be expected after the American war, and deemed necessary for the permanent security of those neighbours who did not wish to experience the effects of their future *growing* preponderance.

But positively to say that France should become another Poland, would be asserting, that some minister or confidential general had
abused

abused their trust, or that by other means some confidential papers had been exposed in confirmation of this fact.—It appears that the Jacobins either conceived the clearest idea, or that they had received the best instructions how to destroy France internally:—be this as it may, the reader will be able to distinguish the difference between the facts I state, and those asserted by bombastic authors *, who have substituted fiction for facts, which were calculated to render themselves the heroes of their own tale, or to conceal their own crimes: But it may already be discerned, from the foregoing narrative, and it will also be proved in the following work, that Europe, on all sides, was more or less infected by that worst, and most contagious disease, the destruction of good order, in every class of men;—that horrors and crimes of every description had, seemingly, become a virtue;—that *king-killing* was the standing order of the day, and the modern rage;—and that sovereignty was marching by rapid strides to universal dissolution; none will doubt this to be the fact, that the two extremities of Europe were diseased, and in a high fever,

Poland

* Dumourier and De Calonne.

Poland, and *France*, so that the framers of mischief adopted the old adage, “ that, as violent diseases require violent remedies, it was better to lop off two branches, than to let the whole tree perish.”

I do not mean to prove, that either the conduct of Calonne, or the orders of the Duke of Brunswick, brought on the fatal catastrophe and retreat; but that each had its share of importance; and it is probable that the conduct of Calonne, which threw a slur upon the cause of the Emigrants, might also operate in the determination of the different cabinets, who might be led to hate and despise, and consequently to abandon a set of men among the Emigrants, although far from home, who were betraying their protectors, squandering their money, and sowing the seeds of discord every where:—But on this part of the subject, the author will be more explicit in his military details, in the work at large.

To conclude—the campaign in Champagne presents us with three prominent features:—First, that the princes were deluded
into

into a belief, that great exertions had been made in the interior of France, in favour of the royal cause; and that immense sums had been expended there, in order to effect a counter-revolution.—Second, that it had the appearance of a pre-concerted plan among all the coalesced powers, to destroy France, by whatever means might be deemed the most likely to accomplish it.—And, Thirdly, that Prussia, with a view to its own aggrandizement in the future dismemberment of France, had abandoned, in fact, her interests; and by the peace which he afterwards made, it would appear that he wished the contending parties should exhaust themselves by a continuance of the war, that he might afterwards turn circumstances to his *own advantage*.

With regard to the first, it must be observed, that the only circumstance which M. De Calonne effected, was the emigration of the principal adherents to the royal cause. This eventually was a great misfortune to it*; but

* The emigration weakened the royal party in France, left the king defenceless, drove the nation to despair, and brought on all the calamities and the massacre of the 10th of August.

but had advantage been taken of the defection of La Fayette's army, perhaps the extravagance of the ex-minister would have been forgotten, and even produced the desired effect. Unluckily, however, for the Princes, the exertions said to have been made in France, never had any existence; and nothing could have happened more opportunely to serve the republican cause, than the conduct of the king of Prussia following close upon the heels of that of M. De Calonne*.

If it had been a pre-concerted plan to ruin France, it was very natural for our ministry to take the part they did, viz. to assist the weakest against the strongest, with this proviso, that if there existed a probability for the princes to establish royalty, it was always in the

* Those who have watched Calonne's unfixed principles and conduct, may venture to anticipate, that on a future day he will declare himself a *staunch Republican*, plead the services he rendered to the Convention, the injuries he has done to Royalty, and that his banishment was the result of despotism. St. Morys and De Calonne's niece have already got reinstated by that means, and paying their *passport* in English bank notes.

the power of the allies to counteract any success likely to be decisive.

Besides, they had constantly for their plea, not only the cause of royalty, but the destruction of anarchy, and the consequent re-establishment of order.

Apprehensive likewise of the effects of republican energy, in a commercial competition, England may very possibly be stimulated to still greater exertions.

The author is aware, that each of the high contending parties will have their respective adherents, and even advocates; but, as he conceives it to be his duty to promulgate truth, at least in his conception, and being quite independent in principle, and as he apprehends, unbiaſſed in judgment, he is not in the least concerned as to the construction that malevolence may put upon his communications.

As to past events, without offering any decided opinion of his own, he submits these
barely

barely as suggestions naturally arising from facts which are within the compass of his own knowledge; leaving his readers to draw from them such conclusions as they may think proper.

A

NARRATIVE

OF THE

EXPEDITION TO QUIBERON BAY,

IN ESSAYS.

ESSAY I.

SOON after St. Morys arrived in London, under the auspices of his colleague De Calonne, the difficulty was how to screen him from the pursuit of those numerous claimants which he had created by his *nefarious practices* upon the continent.

In order to effect this, it was necessary to hold him forth as a great acquisition to the British government; capable of annihilating the Republic of France, comparatively speaking, sooner than all the allied forces together.

The artful misrepresentations made use of, had their effect; they were swallowed with avidity by certain leading men in administration, who did not give themselves time to investigate

St.

St. Morys *previous conduct* in the Royal Cause; much less what could be the motives that actuated him in his *pretended*, and more than *ordinary zeal*.

Every requisite was now allowed St. Morys to carry his illicit fabric of forged assignats, in Hans Place, Knightsbridge, into execution. This can be proved by facts, which would have been exhibited in Westminster-Hall, had not means been used to stifle it.

The attempt to destroy French credit by an inundation of these false assignats was, by Calonne's intrigues, solely vested in the hands of this *virtuous* and *disinterested* relation, who, through his numerous horde of minions (besides the proposed plan to supply the Vendean army) made a regular traffic of this paper money, which infested all Germany, already groaning under the oppression of war. This traffic not only weakened the resources of the allies, by the ruin it brought upon the enterprising fair traders, who fell victims to a privileged circulation of St. Morys forgeries, but most powerfully strengthened the resources of the Republic, who found a plausible pretext for the strange depreciation of their paper. It has been said they made waggon-loads of assignats more than the Convention voted. They distributed them with profusion; then
 classed

classed them with the false; disclaimed the greatest part, and finally paid none.

Some of those victims pursued St. Morys to England; not doubting that they would obtain justice in this country, where French intriguers, as they supposed, would hardly be able to rule in the manner they had done in Germany. Even in England, however, they found means to trample upon the laws of the country.

To the shame of certain leading men in office, they procured St. Morys a protection against the pursuits of his lawful creditors. By imposing upon the *Marquis of Spinola*, the *Genoese ambassador*, who, at *their request*, put St. Morys upon the list of his suite. By this imprudent conduct, had it been represented to the French Government at the time, the Marquis would have exposed his country to the just resentment of that republic, then in their power.

Criminal prosecutions were soon after carried on against St. Morys, and two of De Calonne's neices, for perjury, for which they were indicted*, and judges warrants issued for their

* Colonel Sinclair indicted them for perjury committed upon an arbitration, and although they had been duly sworn in Court,
yet

their apprehension. Strong suspicion of forgery upon the Bank of England were entertained against him at the same time; which suspicions were further grounded upon what *transpired upon an arbitration, relative to St. Morys sending to England for engraving tools and three Bank Notes of the Bank of England.* These circumstances rendered it necessary to hurry him out of the way of justice. In this all the parties interested lent a ready hand.

The Quiberon tragedy being now ready for the stage, St. Morys took the *English* and fictitious *treasure under his charge*; an office which indeed he had reserved for another, with whom he had stipulated for 4000l. under the form of a loan to a *certain* lord, to secure his patronage. This last intended defraud was, however, frustrated by his sudden departure, which was hastened by his dread of the pillory. The department he himself was to fill, was to be created by proclamation upon their arrival in France, as will appear in the succeeding part of this narrative. Upon this occasion several cases of British gold were in-

yet when they were brought to trial, Lord Kenyon dismissed the prosecution, without opening the proceedings, by which, established a precedent quite novel and dangerous, that false evidence given on arbitrations is not perjury.

trusted

trusted to this virtuous treasurer and commissary-general to dispose of in France, in order to effect the joint projects of himself and De Calonne, as soon as they had got into that country.

To avoid any responsibility which might accrue, it was deemed necessary to raise up a *man of straw*, to be *solely* at their *beck*, as the principal actor, the better to conceal their own interested views.

De Puiffaye was the tool they could best trust in this part of their plan; he having been long employed as an underling in the false assignat manufactory. This puppet they moved by invisible springs, to the execution of horrors which, when recited, will make humanity shudder.

This De Puiffaye was never a soldier, only a *yeoman* of the guards, quitted his master, the king, to serve in the National Assembly; not indeed as a respectable supporter of the then constitution, but as a despicable shuttlecock, devoted by turns to every party; and who, after deserting his master and his cause, deserted *even the appearance of common honesty*. Ignorant of military matters, it was not strange then that M. D'Harville should refuse to act with

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such

such a wretch, who could only suit such men as employed him *.

Although this is a true picture of De Puissaye, he was nevertheless introduced, and represented to our ministry, as a great military character; but, in reality, he never was in *the Army*, being only what is here called a beef-eater, one of the *Cent Suiffe*, as above recited.

As a proof of the infatuation of our ministry in employing these characters, it is a fact, that at a council held upon the Quiberon expedition, at which Lord Moira assisted, De Puissaye was much interrogated as to the means of *effecting a junction with Charette, his knowledge of the country, &c.* LORD MOIRA particularly questioned him, with

* La Quotidienne, a French paper, says, " Puissaye is, at this moment, of all men in France, best acquainted with the secret of essentially serving the Jacobins, though perhaps animated with a desire to promote the interests of kings. I do not know whether princes have made any secret agreement with the assassins of Louis XVI. but every one must know that the man who at Quiberon delivered up the best officers of the royal navy to be massacred—who betrayed Charette in La Vendee—who appeared in this city in the month of Vendemiaire—who might have been frequently arrested, but has always escaped—and who has been successively the slave of Orleans, the Girondists, the Mountain, and England, can never become the faithful servant of princes, or the friend of honest men.

with the chart in his hand, *by what road he intended to convey cannon through the country?* To all which he gave such confused answers, as neither himself nor any one present understood. It also appeared to the council that he was as *ignorant of Brittany* as he was of *Geography*; at which Lord Moira both expressed his surprize and disgust.

ESSAY II.

HAVING exemplified the distinguished HEROES of *Coblentz* and *Quiberon Fame*, we will next proceed to view the causes that brought them forward, in the *latter tragedy*; the motives by which they were actuated, and the consequences that followed.

Charette had often, during three years civil war in the Vendee, resisted powerful armies with a few undisciplined men. And such were the advantages which the country gave him, that when the garrison of Mentz, that capitulated not to serve against the allies, were sent against them, to the number of 15,000, with a numerous train of artillery, Charette, with 500 men, the full extent of his army, retired into the woods and mountains, where neither artillery nor cavalry could
act

act or follow; and however strange it may appear, the whole of that brave veteran army, that had made the Austrians, Prussians, and Allies fly before them, were totally destroyed by that handful of men; the same as at the memorable battle of Saumur, where Charette made 36,000 Republicans bite the dust, and where rivers of blood flowed by the rusty weapons of Charette's army, who, almost without clothes or arms, rushed upon the enemy with pikes and sticks, took their cannon, and turned them to advantage. Thus, whether by fanaticism, or enthusiasm, did Charette everywhere prevail, until he was deluded by the false operations of those who pretended to send him succour. His brilliant victories, till then, were numbered by his battles. The Republic experienced *more carnage*, and more trouble, through him, than all the Allies beside. She sought peace with him, but he only granted *a suspension of arms*, upon the condition that the young king (Louis XVII.) was to be delivered up to him at the *Castle of Choisi*; but the death of the infant king immediately succeeding the suspension, rekindled the Vendean war, and Charette again appeared at the head of his faithful followers.

Charette, at this time, turned his attention towards England, whose sincerity he had always doubted; but the great armament so long preparing

paring under Lord Moira, subdued his apprehensions, and he dispatched his plans to London, and to Louis XVIII. in Germany; recommending to this nation to beware of intriguing and interested characters; that as he wanted only a little assistance to render him formidable, being then upon the coast, and covered by the *Loire*, he requested that the emigrant officers might be sent to join him. He wrote at the same time to Louis XVIII. either to come, and benefit by the advantages gained for him, or at least to send his august brother to head the armament of emigrants fitting out in England. Louis XVIII. with all possible speed, dispatched his brother with a numerous staff of the first general officers in Europe; and at the same time sent a courier to Charette, with the *commission* of Lieutenant-General, next in command under his royal brother, Comte D'Artois.

This arrangement of affairs little accorded with Lord Moira's *ambitious mind*, who long had been in the habit of considering himself as the commander in chief, and as such to be afterwards recorded the conqueror of the *French Republic*.

The intriguers who were ever about Lord Moira, soon pointed out the way to avoid his
serving

serving as third in command, even under the immortal Charette.

The man of straw, De Puiffaye, as already stated, was brought from the assignat manufactory; and although Lord Moira had so recently humbled him on account of his ignorance before the Council, he yet was transformed into a great and expert general; and strongly recommended to be put at the head of an army which should precede that which was to be got ready upon the arrival of the commander in chief, the Comte D'Artois.

This tremendous general, with his army, was to have infallibly ensured the success of the grand expedition of the prince, by the powerful diversions *he was to make* in Normandy and Brittany; by which he was to have kept Charette upon the banks of the Loire, in safe possession of all his positions, until the royal Prince should arrive to benefit by the intended junction.

The machinations and intrigues of De Calonne, in bringing about this arrangement, and its object, were seen through with horror and disgust by the respectable part of the French in this country; and representations of the base characters of St.

Morys

Morys and De Puiffaye, were made to our ministers, from all quarters.

The Marechal Duc De Broglie, in the name of Louis XVIII. sent a memorial from Germany to our ministry, detailing the danger and misfortunes which eventually came to pass, and which he elucidated by his experimental and his usual virtuous arguments. The Marquis de la Rozier, universally allowed to be the first and most scientific officer in Europe, and chief of the Marshal's staff, who came over to this country, forcibly and clearly demonstrated the fallacy of the plan. The Duke of Harcourt, as minister to Louis XVIII. and several other personages who had access to the cabinet ministers, used all their influence against the destroyers of the royal cause. Mr. Windham, however, was accused by all the Emigrants as still remaining inflexible; but this did not prevent the same representations being made to the first personage in the kingdom. The Comte de Behague, a French general of very high distinction, also determined to take direct methods to unmask those false Frenchmen who were imposing upon government; and accordingly obtained an interview, through Lord Kinnaird, with Mr. Dundas; to whom he disclosed who and what De Puiffaye and St. Morys were, their motives, and the inevitable consequences

quences of employing them. Mr. Dundas objected to taking any part in the business*.

The Comte de Behague, being determined not to let the matter rest here, obtained an audience of the king, to whom, he used the same arguments. His majesty appeared shocked, and sent for the minister; when some *alterations* are said to have taken place. It was also said that his majesty remarked, in justification of these representations, "Who can judge so truly of these men, who are all reprobated, as the nobility of France? And who has so much to dread from the consequences as those whose cause has, as hitherto, been ruined by dangerous intriguers?"

These different alarms and apprehensions evince what a strange fatality must have possessed
our

* This fact, which is incontrovertible, must strike all reasonable men as one of the most glaring proofs of the extreme absurdity of employing such a man as *war-minister*. In the court of Justiciary, or in the House of Commons, he is certainly a veteran jurist in the *war of words*, but to conduct the most complicated, difficult, and disastrous war that was ever waged by this country, a more unhappy choice could not have been made—a choice indeed confessedly destitute of every requisite for so important a station. The melancholy consequences are engraved in characters of blood on the plains of La Vendee, the rocks of Quiberon, the sands of Dunkirk, and the dikes of Flanders; but these were trifles, nor did they deter him from promoting his own sucking tribe to unqualified rank and unmerited honours.

our ministry in undertaking the Quiberon Expedition.

They were entertained everywhere; and corresponded with the following extracts of letters found upon Le Maitre, former secretary to the king, when he was arrested at Paris.

“ Our real friends in London are much embarrassed about the nomination of De Puiffaye, who is nothing but *an intriguer*; but that of St. Morys, the relation of De Calonne, being made Intendant of the Catholic Army, is worse still. The adventure of Quiberon will open the eyes of the English respecting that base character St. Morys, who is a friend to no party. If the first attempt should not succeed, the English are going to make the streams of Pactoclus flow amidst the league.”

Another:—“ De Calonne is now playing off the same artifices on the English as he exercised at Coblenz. That dangerous man is now become desperate; he glories in our misfortunes.”

Another:—“ If Mr. Pitt does not open his eyes, De Calonne will ruin all Europe. That hypocrite St. Morys is in great credit, and has set off to Quiberon with his trash of assignats. De

M

Puiffaye

Puissaye is his automaton, and he is the actor for De Calonne."

The same means which Calonne used at Coblenz to impose upon the Princes and allies, about his *intelligence, correspondence, and partizans* in France, De Puissaye adopted to impose upon our ministers, and as Calonne's deceptions were known among a few of the well informed, it cannot be a matter of surprize that he should not appear in the fore-ground in the Expedition to Quiberon—No! that would have been too gross an impeachment of the understanding of our Ministry. He therefore employed his puppets, who transacted the business. To accelerate his plans in England, his relation St. Morys was introduced; and he, in his turn, introduced the valiant hero De Puissaye, as already mentioned.

De Calonne, ingulphed in SELF, has discovered a versatility that would render the smallest reliance upon him dangerous. When he saw that he had disgraced and ruined the Royal Cause, could no longer hope for favour from the Bourbon Family in the *regular line of succession*; when he saw that he had nothing to hope from any of the parties in France, having
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in his writings changed sides according to circumstances, to no purpose, he at length asserted, in his book, entitled *Le Tableau de l'Europe*, "That the Salique Law did not exist in France;" and adds, as plain as can be understood, "That Louis XVIII. neither by *right* or *merit*, is entitled to the Crown; but that it belongs to Madame *La Princess Royale*."

If we enquire into the reason why De Calonne should at this moment broach such a doctrine, we acknowledge ourselves at a loss. The fertility of invention indeed might suggest, that such a character as De Calonne, ever intent upon his *own interest*, might *anticipate* the marriage of the Princess Royal of France with a powerful Foreign Prince—might, in fact, see them seated on the throne of Louis—himself reinstated in his former splendour, as Minister of Finance, as the cause of this wonderful change; and all through the assistance of his imaginary myriads, devoted to the Royal Cause, whom he represented to the Allies at Coblenz as *ready to sacrifice their lives and fortunes*. If such was the case, he may enjoy his golden dream, until we wake him with the horrors of the Quiberon Expedition—horrors and massacres in a piece with those of which he was the author in the Campaign in 1792.

How

How must the indignation of the historian be awakened in transmitting to posterity the account of slaughter, from the false information of an interested individual and his emissaries, in pretending to receive friendly invitations from those in power, when they were traced to be the fabrications of his own brain?—Like the letters he presented to the King of Prussia, purporting to be from the Commanders in the fortresses of Strasbourg, Metz, Thionville, &c. offering to surrender the garrisons, were impudent forgeries?—What in the eye of the Public ought to be the portion of such a character? Can there be any punishment too great for such crimes? And yet this is the man to whom our Ministry have *listened*; by whom they have BEEN DECEIVED.

ESSAY

ESSAY III.

AS De Calonne could not openly interfere in the Quiberon business, he pretended the greatest ignorance of who and what De Puiffaye was; but the same time he admired, applauded, and, by every species of intrigue, urged the infallibility of the system laid down by that puppet, and of which he had secretly been the author.

The expresses which arrived, like those sent to Coblenz, went so far as to extol in very forcible terms the superior influence which *the Comte Joseph De Puiffaye* possessed over the Bretons, whose confidence was solely centered in him. These declarations were sanctioned by the signatures of the pretended chiefs of the Chouans, the leading characters at sea-ports, and the different officers of the municipalities of the adjacent districts. Charette, however, never gave into any of the snares that could induce him to urge the adoption of De Puiffaye's plans. On the contrary, he saw through those detestable underhand manœuvres which his noble mind had ever despised, and he accordingly warned

warned our government, as also Louis XVIII. to be careful in whom they placed confidence.

Such prudent admonitions, however, were overpowered by duplicity, and the irresistible influence of French intrigue. On the one hand, Louis XVIII. while he expressed his alarms at the nomination of St. Morys and De Puiffaye, the one a hypocrite and deceiver, and the other an unknown character in the army, a fawning underling sycophant about court, was constrained to give his full approbation to that measure, under the impression that it was the absolute will of the British government. On the other hand, Mr. Windham was imposed upon by the most positive testimonies of Louis XVIII.'s approbation, by appointing De Puiffaye to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

From this concatenation of circumstances in favour of De Puiffaye, our ministers, at the then momentous crisis, decidedly adopted such measures as were likely to ensure success; and determined that he should be the Commander in Chief. It was, nevertheless, given out, in order to appease the clamours of the higher order of French in this country, who protested against De Puiffaye, as also to induce the Emigrants to embark in the expedition, that the command should be
given

given to a general officer worthy of possessing their confidence. The Comte D'Harville was accordingly applied to for that purpose; and at the general solicitation of the Emigrants he accepted, as he imagined, of the office of Commander in Chief of the Quiberon Expedition. Under this idea, a body of naval officers, the flower of France, joined the volunteers, and were all sacrificed. Had this last nomination of a Commander in Chief been confirmed as it was adopted, there is every reason to believe, that a junction would have been effected with Charette, and the diversion have proved favourable to the allies.

But, no! this would have defeated all De Calonne's projects, however ridiculous, in his attempt to introduce a new order of things in France, by expunging the Salique Law. By this, could it have been accomplished, he hoped to have returned to France, as being the chief instrument in bringing it about. From what afterwards transpired in the proclamation issued by De Puissaye, we shall be better able to judge of De Calonne's intentions, as well as of the mournful circumstances that attended the Quiberon tragedy.

Among the rest of the infamous falsehoods imposed

posed upon our ministry, it was stated by De Puiffaye, " that the whole province of Brittany was ready to join his army; that they were in want of nothing but arms, ammunition, and clothes; that no British troops were even wanted; but that the corps of Emigrants, raised by England, would prove a sufficient force to assist the embodied Chouans, and the country at large, who would instantly join them in a mass."

The principal intention of the intriguers, in this delusion, was to induce government to send out an adequate quantity of provisions and stores, which accordingly was the case: and had they not been captured by the enemy, the immensity of the sacrifice was such, that, in all probability, the astonishing loss which this nation met with, the detail and estimation were such as never would have met the public eye. Of this more hereafter.

About 4,000 men out of the 11,000 emigrant troops in our service, the annual expence of whom (exclusive of provisions) was stated at half a million, sailed under the command of the Comte D'Harville, escorted by two ships of 74 guns, and six frigates, under Sir John Borlase Warren. On the 16th of June, 1795, the fleet anchored on the coast of France, near the isle Noirmoutier. Here
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De Puiffaye declared his authority, and took upon him the command of the army.

The ifle of Noirmoutier is an excellent rendezvous, is the moft confiderable ifland in that quarter, and quite contiguous to Charette's army. It was excellently calculated for head quarters, and was a perfectly fafe depot for the treasures, magazines of ftores, hofpitals, &c.

Charette's great and declared reason for keeping upon the banks of the Loire, and fo near the coaft, was, that he might be ready immediately to co-operate with the forces collected at Southampton, fo long promifed to be fent to his affiftance.

The above advantages, which Noirmoutier alone could have afforded, cannot be better elucidated than by the recital of an acknowledged fact. Charette having fometime before been affured from England, that Lord Moira, with his army, was about to embark, in order to make a defcent upon the coaft of France, he loft no time, but difpatched an officer to England, with full inftructions as to the difpofition of the country, and the danger of making a defcent in any other place than where he could protect them; and he pointed out Noirmoutier, as poffeffing every re-

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quifite

quisite for the accommodation of an army intended to act in that quarter. As an additional proof of this, the Republicans had sent troops, and made considerable depot in the same island.

This valiant royalist Charette, fully relying that such advantages would not be overlooked by Lord Moira, whose zeal indicated a strong desire to succeed, went so far as to point this island as the rendezvous where the two armies should meet. "Although," said he, "I have neither got vessels to convey me there, or armed ships to cover my passage, or to keep it against a siege, I will, nevertheless, be punctual to my appointment; and then my fatigued army shall pay homage to the generous succouring British arms; while the most flattering event in my life will be to embrace their Ajax, upon the island which will be conquered for their reception."

Whatever was the reason ministers did not profit by the favourable arrangement, it is certainly like the rest of their ambiguous and very unaccountable conduct.

ESSAY IV.

CHARETTE proceeded along the Coast as far as Bouvois, gaining the nearest point to the Isles of Bouin and Noirmoutier. He made himself master of all the adjacent country, as far as *Painbeuf*, and the mouth of the *Loire*, and he gathered together all the boats and timber he could find. With the latter his indefatigable troops made *rafters*; upon these he embarked them in order of battle, and with his few boats he towed them to the two islands, in defiance of every opposition. He conquered them, as he had promised.

Upon Noirmoutier, Charette found immense magazines of ammunition, provisions, &c. and there he waited, anxiously looking, but looking in vain, for the arrival of Lord Moira. This post was too important to the republicans not to retake. It was, therefore, regularly besieged both by sea and land. Charette defended it for some time with the utmost bravery. At length he was obliged to abandon it; and he made his retreat, with his usual intrepidity, through the
fire

fire of the Republican batteries and gun boats. Several of his *rafters* and boats were destroyed by the enemy's cannon: some escaped on the wrecks, regardless of the heavy musquetry; others landed on the rafters, and made their way through the troops which lined the shore. Charette, at their head, led the example; about two-thirds escaped; but the sick and wounded, and his rear-guard, were all cut off. Upwards of 2,000 were made prisoners; amongst whom was the brave Stofflet, Commander of the Rear Guard, who, with two others, only could, by a miraculous stratagem, have escaped death. No less than 1,800 of these brave heroes were either shot or drowned by the orders of Thureau and Bourbotte.

After this dreadful disaster, Charette, with his shattered army, regained his posts in the country, there to await the promised succour from England, with which he hoped to co-operate. Disappointed in his first expectations, what could Charette think of our government? Or what apology can the government offer in first inducing that immortal hero to undertake such a hazardous enterprise, attended with such fatigue, such loss, such massacre; and then exposing him unsupported, to an exasperated and deadly foe? This is a stain that ministers will not easily wipe out

out, a stigma not easily forgotten!—If, however, they should be considered, “*Trifles light as air,*” we, ourselves, will make the reply in the sequel of this narrative.

But to return to the General D’Harville. The rectitude of his conduct speaks for itself. His command ceased the instant he had conducted the troops to the only and true point where a regular line of operation could have been adopted. But contrary to every military arrangement, and every visible advantage likely to be enjoyed, Monsieur De Puiffaye ordered the descent to be made at Quiberon, at an immense distance from Charette. Here he pretended, with the profoundest secrecy, that great preparations were making for his reception; when, in reality, neither army nor troops existed near the spot. Some straggling banditti of marauders and despicable Chouans, in small parties, lurking in the woods and mountains, indeed, gave a colourable pretext for his mysterious conduct, which none but a few of his party could unriddle.

The fleet having put about, and come back as far as Quiberon Bay, the poor unfortunate Royalists on shore stood gaping, in anxious solicitude, from every eminence, till their promised succourers were out of sight. If any
person

person of the meanest capacity will take the trouble to examine the map, he would be apt to conceive from the retrograde motion of De Puiffaye, that he had been intent on effecting something hostile to the very cause he came to support.

During nine days from the 16th June, this numerous fleet was, visibly to all on shore, parading along the coast, seemingly at a loss for a destination. The natural alarm which it created, gave full time to the Republicans to consider the best mode of defence which they ought to adopt. The fleet, at length, assembled in Quiberon Bay, on the 26th, when they came to anchor.

Monfieur D'Harville immediately went on shore, to satisfy his doubt as to the assertions of De Puiffaye; whose ambiguity and erroneous accounts upon the passage, had impressed serious alarms upon the minds of some of the discerning, yet deceived Noblesse on board. From the very formidable appearance of the fleet, every thing hostile had fled from the villages; and Monfieur D'Harville had an uninterrupted conversation with the inhabitants, who informed him of the real situation of that part of the country with great candour and confidence.

From

From these conversations, and other corroborating circumstances, he perceived clearly that De Puiffaye had not the interest, information, or influence, which he pretended to have; and that the British Government had been deceived by his false reports. D'Harville stated the probable consequences of disembarking to Commodore Warren, and the propriety of sending dispatches to England for instructions, before so many lives and such an immense treasure should *be idly exposed*. Sir John Warren's orders were direct and positive, to land the troops, &c. wherever De Puiffaye should order them; who even persisted that he was right, and that it was only the effects of envy that induced D'Harville to bring in such unfavourable reports. Accordingly he gave orders for landing the troops; and about one half of them were immediately put on shore. The next day, the 27th, Monsieur D'Harville, anxious for his own honour, as well as for the good of the cause, and the better to inspire the army with confidence in the expedition, charged himself with filling the functions of Quarter-Master General, took a few troops and one officer, and went to reconnoitre the country, and take up positions. He made a circuitous march of several miles, from right to left; but everywhere was he assured by the
villagers

villagers and peasants, " that no formidable bodies of Chouans did exist; that they were in small gangs, like our gypsies; that they were attached to no particular party or cause, except that of rapine and plunder, by which alone they subsisted; that they were chiefly in a state of nature, quite wild, and so singularly fleet and long-winded, from being continually hunted by the pillaged peasants, that it was very difficult to catch them. They were also represented as consisting chiefly of the dregs of every depraved class in the community. Some were idlers from the cities and manufacturing towns, who in all times, *peace* or *war*, prefer *thieving* to *working*; whose pretext in following their depraved inclinations, was political persecution and requisitions: Others were malefactors who had deserted from the Republican troops to escape punishment; but great numbers were marauders, with their hair cut short, who had been banished from the heroic armies of Charette and Stofflet, for malpractices in the Vendee. Their original leader had been a *Chef des Brigands*, Captain of Banditti under the old government, &c.

This description of the Chouan hordes that were to join the British Army, Monsieur D'Harville found to be the same everywhere, and
confirmed

confirmed his opinion of the danger of confiding in such an ally *L'Armee dans la Lune*, the expression made use of by the French Emigrants. He returned; but found De Puiffaye had not then ventured on shore.

ESSAY V.

AMONG other interesting circumstances, Monsieur D'Harvilly reported that the Republican troops had evacuated all the adjacent posts and neighbouring villages which they occupied, and had retired to Aurai; but that he was aware, from every appearance, and from the reports he had received, that they were using some stratagem to entice the feeble force to come against them further into the country, or to encourage them to land all their stores, ammunition, &c. No doubt they had both these objects in view; and none but a traitor, who expected to share in the booty, would have acted as De Puiffaye did.

D'Harvilly, too, urged the propriety of not trusting unweildy valuables on shore; but ad-

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vifed

vised keeping them on board the transports, or forming magazines upon the adjacent isle of Houat. By this precaution, in case of a retreat, the army would not have been encumbered, and an immense treasure would have been prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy. These prudent admonitions being contrary to the objects which De Puiffaye was directed to pursue, he insisted that every thing provided for the expedition of which he had the command, should be landed without delay. M. D'Harvilly accordingly took his positions, and the troops were put into cantonments in the different villages, on the right, left, and centre of the landing place. M. D'Harvilly put his own regiment at Carnac, the regiment of Hector in the villages on the right, Du Dresnai, in those on the left, the Royal Emigrants in the interval next the centre, and the Royal Artillery in the rear at St. Clements; but the head quarters of De Puiffaye were on the seashore, *in the rear of the park of artillery*. Of these safe quarters he took care to avail himself afterwards.

This position of the army was made with great military judgment: it formed half a circle, bounded on the right and left by the bay, and
afforded

afforded an excellent retreat in case of any disastrous event.

From the 27th June, to the 2d July, the army did not make one movement, either to gain territory, or to fortify the posts which they occupied. Complaints were continually making against De Puiffaye for his inaction; whilst it was hourly reported by the peasants who came in, that formidable reinforcements were daily joining the Republican army; and that they were very vigilant in fortifying every position. Nothing, however, moved De Puiffaye, whose first object appeared to be landing of the stores, &c. This chimerical foldier, having been a few days uninterrupted on shore, began to suppose himself in reality a military genius, and was always speaking of advancing to Rennes, pretending that the Chouan reinforcements would join him after he had thrown himself into that town. Every day he formed new excuses for not putting himself at the head of the army, and exploring the country.

Representations were made by every officer (except his own creatures) of the danger and impropriety of forming the magazines almost in the front

front posts—a circumstance never before heard of in any army: but this produced no other effect than his boasting of soon being able to bring the Chouans about him, by convincing them that he had brought them plenty of every article they were in need of. In reality, he took every method to decoy and allure the natives: he exposed and displayed the great profusion of stores in the same manner as goods are exhibited at a fair, in order to tempt the surrounding multitude. The tidings of such plenty were propagated by his hirelings; and the whole country assembled in crowds upon the hills; at a due distance, to gaze upon the expected harvest. It appeared afterwards, that these very people were excited by the Republican army to go to Quiberon, that they might share of the English bounty.

De Puiffaye now began to conceive he had got the whole country on his side; and that he would soon render himself independent of his distrustful Emigrant troops: nevertheless, he was rather alarmed at the rumour of his carrying on a secret correspondence with the Republican Generals, through the medium of a pretended Chouan chief, who quarrelled with an Emigrant officer at the fore-post, while he was detained as a suspected person, on account of his frequently passing
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ing and repassing between the armies, and who had destroyed some papers upon his being stopped.

This Chouan produced, and pleaded in excuse, De Puiffaye's passport: but among other papers found upon him, was a safe-guard through the Republican army. This had occasioned the harsh epithets bestowed upon him; but he, in return, among other invectives, accused the Emigrants of being the slaves and tools of tyranny; that their career would be short in France; that although Monarchy was about to be established, despotism was at an end; that " young Capet" was dead; and that the rest of the male line had forfeited their right to the crown; and that the sole heir, the young Princess, would soon be allied to a Prince, who would meet the wishes of the French nation, &c.

Let any impartial person compare these circumstances with the unaccountable doctrine broached about this time by De Calonne, in his book entitled, " Le Tableau de l'Europe;" and he must draw conclusions not very favourable to either that author or the Quiberon Hero.

The above event happened on the 29th: and De Puiffaye ordered the Chouan to be brought
before

before him the same night. He never more was heard of!—

De Puiffaye very naturally dreaded the fury of the army, which was chiefly composed of a set of men whose sole object was the restoration of their rights, and to escape those miseries brought on them by intrigue. He therefore lost no time in removing any doubts entertained of his principles. He therefore, on the morning of the 30th, issued a proclamation fraught with craft and subtlety, and which leaves a strong scent of De Calonne. The following are extracts:

“ I, *Joseph Comte De Puiffaye, Lieutenant-General of the King's armies ; Commander in Chief of the Catholic and Royal Army of Brittany, &c. &c.*

FRENCHMEN,

“ In the name of God, of your *Infant King*, and of your lawful Princes, we come to you with words of peace. Let the voice of *hatred, revenge*, and mistrust, be heard no longer. Let every odious party denunciation, that rallying signal of the tormentors of our ill-fated countrymen, be destroyed for ever: Listen to us without prepossession, as we shall speak to you without disguise, and let Europe hear and judge us:” &c.

“ If

“ If it be true, that, from one corner of the kingdom to the other, a general outcry has been heard against that *parricide faction* which for these five years past has caused all your misfortunes ;— if it be true, that at length a spirit of *moderation* and *justice* guides those who affect to represent you, and if this moderation is not merely a specious cloak for the secret design of *displacing rivals*, to reign in their stead, and to plunge you again into the convulsions of faction, and the horrors of anarchy, why are those of your fellow-citizens (Emigrants) who were forced to fly from that tyranny, which your pretended representatives affect to disapprove, *not recalled into the bosom of their families*, and re-established in the possession of their rights and estates? Why is the *interesting* and *august* offspring of so many Kings, the son of the unfortunate Louis XVI. *not proclaimed King*, and restored to the throne of his forefathers?— *he has never erred or offended against your laws; he cannot have forfeited any of his rights* by breathing foreign air, or seeking an asylum with your enemies!—and finally, after having pulled down the tyranny of Robespierre, and banished his miscreants who desolated France, why do you seemingly endeavour to preserve their works, and to reap the fruits of their crimes? Let those who obstinately persist in the exercise of an *usurped* power, prove, by restoring it to the lawful owner,

that

that their professions of moderation and justice are not like those of their predecessor, and that they are no accomplices of those criminals whom they now prosecute. Divine justice has already employed them as instruments to punish the guilty—some of them are yet unpunished;—but eminent services can obliterate great crimes; and men engaged in the cause for which we are fighting, ought to resign to heaven the task of punishment and revenge.

“ And ye generals, officers, and foldiers, who tired of being the tools of oppression and crimes, refused to become the executioners of their brethren;—ye, who, by means of *correspondence* lately *established between us*, have learnt to appreciate our sentiments, rely on our word, and take in our ranks the places that are offered you—Join us to restore to France her former prosperity—be the saviours of our country—the deliverers of a young Prince, ready to reward your services. It is glorious to receive the price of valour from the hands of a King, whom we have reinstated in his rights! What recompense did your predecessors receive from your tyrants?—Humiliation, banishment, and death!—What will you chuse?” &c. &c.

Signed, Head-quarters of Carnæ,
30th of June, 1795.

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One would hardly believe that the very people who exceed all others in intrigue, should so easily be misled and imposed upon by the same species of deception of which they are so much masters. But it so happened, that De Puiffaye gained an entire confidence among the Emigrants, from his seeming loyalty, and particular attachment to their interest expressed in his proclamation. He nevertheless was at the same time soliciting Hoche and Tallien to set on foot a treaty to introduce the new order of things in favour of the female branch of the House of Bourbon, offering them great rewards and the highest offices for their services. Even in his proclamation he holds the same language, and carefully introduces an acknowledgment of his correspondence; but he cautiously avoids mentioning the death of the Infant King, of which he and his colleagues had had previous information. This left an opening for introducing De Calonne's sentiments on the Salique Law, and his famous plan, which we shall introduce to our readers in our next Essay.

ESSAY VI.

IN De Puissaye's proclamation, issued on the 30th, he avows, in plain terms, his object was different to the cause for which that hero Charette, and his valiant army, had so long struggled, and which puts all doubts out of question, why he did not land at Noirmoutier, or any where near Charette; because he not only being an older lieutenant-general, but idolized by his army: it is clear, how very imprudent it would have been, under such circumstances, for the ablest general in Europe to have taken precedence over him. Therefore De Puissaye being De Calonne's tool to bring about the new system in France, it was necessary De Puissaye should be uncontrouled, and without any hesitation he proclaims himself commander in chief of the King's army, and of the Catholic army of *Brittany*. This public declaration corroborated his assertions to the Republican General in his secret correspondence, which he also avows, in which he represented Charette and his army to be subordinate to his power.

He farther urges, in his secret correspondence, that the Republicans would be better able to
judge

judge of the sincerity of his views, to bring about a new order of things by his own operations; and as a still greater proof of his sincerity, he acknowledged that Louis XVIII. and his brother of Artois, and his sons, had forfeited their claim to the throne; and, in order to do away every pretension which the exiled Princes might form upon the army, his proclamations were to be issued in the name of the deceased infant, Louis XVII. by which means less opposition would be found in the public mind in proposing the right of sovereignty to exist in the only heir, the *innocent princefs*.

These secret propositions, which afterwards transpired, bear so great a resemblance to De Calonne's public writings, at that time, there is hardly a doubt left as to their author. Of this and of De Puiffaye's pacific disposition, we may judge tolerably well from the rest of his military conduct, during his stay at Quiberon.

From the 27th June, on which the army landed, to the 2d July, it remained in the cantonments, quite inactive, without making any other movement, than by the detachments helping to unload the boats. The error of forming immense magazines so near the enemy, became so glaring, that even the soldiers ridiculed the idea. The generals,

nerals, after so many representations, at length prevailed upon De Puiffaye to order an attack to be made upon Fort Penthievre ; which, if carried, would afford protection to the magazines and to the army, in case of a retreat, it being a most interesting and commanding post.

It was accordingly agreed, that M. De Puiffaye, with a strong body of the flower of the army, should cover the Comte D'Harvilly, advancing with his own regiment, and Du Dresnai to endeavour to scale the fort, while the ships were to cannonade it.

Comte D'Harvilly, accordingly, marched in the night ; and at day-break was under the cannon of the fort. De Puiffaye had never marched his troops ; but was seized with a panic, because a contrary wind had prevented the fleet from affording him assistance : he, therefore, ordered the attack to be deferred till next day. This order was, however, too late ; for the enemy had fired the alarm-gun ; they were under arms, and it was supposed they were going to make resistance. In this situation, M. D'Harvilly was too much of a general to make a shameful retreat, because a dastardly traitor thought proper to abandon him and his little force. He arranged his troops upon an eminence, so as to appear to the best advantage ;

tage; and he sent forward his riflemen to annoy any fortie from the fort. The Republicans taking him for an advanced guard to the whole army, which was supposed to be near at hand, and concluding that the fleet was to co-operate with them, together with the circumstances of their being reduced to half a biscuit a-day, were the cause why the Republican garrison of 600 men surrendered to D'Harvilly's handful of men without resistance. De Puissaye was thunderstruck, when he perceived the white and the British flags flying on the fort! While he admired the success, he pleaded that prudence had prevented him from hazarding an attack.

This success, however, disconcerted De Puissaye very much; as the whole army, and even the Chouans, turned both him and his operations into ridicule; infomuch that it was expected a mutiny would have been the consequence.

On the 5th July, it being discovered that neither De Puissaye, nor St. Morys the Commissary, had any knowledge of their departments, it was resolved, in a general council on that day, that all the troops should retire to, and assemble on the peninsula of Quiberon; (abandoning the villages in front, where they had been cantoned from the 27th) for the purpose of restoring order among the troops;

troops; and that De Puiffaye and St. Morys might be instructed in, and *acquire some knowledge of their new professions.*

De Puiffaye gave a colouring to this decision of the council, alledging that the troops had discovered hostile intentions against the Intendant General St. Morys, for neglecting the regular distribution of provisions. This, certainly, was one of the just grounds of complaint; as very often that department was so neglected, that the soldiers harrassed all day, had frequently nothing to eat; the provisions being distributed at night, which ought to have been given out in the morning. On this subject De Puiffaye harangued the troops, and issued orders, exhorting them to be calm; that every neglect in the department of the Intendant-General should be remedied in future; that M. De St. Morys was innocent; that it was the subaltern commissaries who were to blame; pretending that the fate of the expedition, and the future happiness of Frenchmen, depended on that great statesman, who possessed the confidence of the King and the Princes; and that he was charged with the arduous task of modelling the laws, and introducing them agreeably to the French nation and for Louis XVIII. De Puiffaye having thus harangued upon the merits and great consequence of St. Morys, in
his

his affected pompous and emphatical tone, concluded in these words: "I have revealed to you some particulars of this great *statesman* and *lawyer*, whom you will find to be your *Salva Guarda*," &c. &c.

In corroboration of the truth of the above complaints, and the subsequent operations, we have extracted the following authenticated reports made by a distinguished officer upon the spot:

"The madness of never putting men into situations, for which they were qualified, which had already done so much mischief in France before the Revolution, had again the most fatal effects in this unhappy expedition. The most lively imagination cannot form an idea of the disorder which never ceased to reign in that part; the administration of the army; the distributions which should have been made at headquarters over night; that the several regiments might have had their provisions delivered out early in the morning, were, on the contrary, so late, that it was often six o'clock in the evening before the soldiers had any thing to eat.

"The unfortunate inhabitants of Carnac, and the surrounding villages, clearly foresaw all the horrors to which the departure of the army
would

would leave them exposed. They followed the troops to sufficient distance, shedding torrents of tears, and even bitterly complaining that they had deceived them; and after having afforded them a momentary hope, left them defenceless and exposed to the vengeance of the Republicans. A party of them even abandoned their homes and property to follow the army to Quiberon. Although they were assured that the army would not be long ere it returned, and until that time, Royalist Generals and Chouans should be left for their protection; they knew their countrymen too well to be re-animated by such defenders.

“ The Republicans were informed of the retreat of the army to the Peninsula of Quiberon, by their spies; they immediately advanced on Carnac, Provarnet, and St. Barbé. They drove M. De Vauban's division before them, one part of which flung itself into the boats sent by the English to save it, while the other retired in disorder through La Falaise. An innumerable multitude of women and children accompanied them, pursued by the Republicans, who advanced within reach of the guns of the fort. These unhappy wretches were called Chouans.

“ From the 9th to the 15th, the two armies remained tranquil in their cantonments. They could

could distinctly perceive the numerous works the Republicans were erecting at St. Barbé. The difficulty of forcing them was seen to increase daily, and it was thought that the Generals, at length, considering their position in its true point of view, would stand on the defensive, strengthen the fort with unwearied activity, wait patiently for the succours promised, and immediately announce or decide for the re-embarkation, if the enemy, by their superiority of number, should, at last, render it necessary*.

“ Instead of that, the military part was conducted with as little reflection as the administrative. Far from gaining the end proposed, by retreating to the peninsula; *viz.* that of establishing order in the provisions and distributions, the confusion still continued encreasing with a terrible progression. General Puissaye, by his continual teasing, determined Sir John Borlase Warren to disembark, without loss of time, all the provisions that were on board the transports; and these provisions destined for the use of the army, were distributed, and often stolen by the useless Chouans, who filled, or rather infested the peninsula.

* The long inactivity had given the enemy every opportunity to entrench, and fortify themselves close to the Royal army.

ESSAY VII.

“ **M.** D'HERVILLY, on his part, impatiently suffered the enemy to blockade him in the peninsula: he well knew that succours were sent him from England, but he seemed disturbed at the idea of seeing them arrive, without having previously obliged the enemy to abandon the fortifications. In the orders of the 15th, it was desired by De Puiffaye that the troops should hold themselves in readiness to march the same evening, and a plan of general attack was decided upon.

“ Although the plan was very well conceived, it was either too late, or premature. A complete success would have answered no end; for should they even succeed in dislodging the enemy, then amounting to about 6,000 men (which could not be done without a considerable loss) it would be still necessary to return to the peninsula, until support should arrive, to be in a state to resist the increasing strength of the enemy.

“ M. De Vauban was destined to guard an important post; he, with about 2,000 Chouans, disembarked

disembarked towards midnight, at the same point where the army landed on the 27th of June, to march to Mount St. Michael, and make himself master of it. Thence he was to continue his route in the front of Carnac, carefully avoiding the villages; to pass between the Castle of Kergouliac and Plouarnel, and consequently take the batteries and entrenchments of St. Barbé in the rear. This commission, which appeared to be difficult, did not however present any great dangers; because at the same moment the army of the line was to attack by La Falaise, and engage the principal attention of the enemy.

“ M. De Vauban was to fire a rocket on his disembarking, two on his marching forward, and three if he should be compelled to re-embark. He disembarked, marched forward, and made the signals agreed on. No sooner did the Chouans hear the first report of a musquet, than they ran to re-embark with precipitation, swearing that they would go no farther, and returned to Quiberon during the obscurity of the night. It was impossible for Count D'Hervilly to be aware of this movement, the three rockets, the signal agreed on, not having been fired.

“ The advanced guard of the Royal army engaged that of the Republican army a little before day.

day. The firing commenced, and the latter, according to their custom retired. The columns continued to advance, and all the Republican army abandoned its camp and retired into its entrenchments. In this situation it was necessary to come to some decision. M. De Rotalier, commandant of the artillery, and M. De Langlet, went up to Count D'Hervilly; the former proposed causing the artillery to take a position to cover his attack, if he should determine on attacking, or the pillage of the camp, if he should advance no farther. They both joined in persuading him to confine to the latter object the operations of the day. Although the three rockets, which ought to have been fired, as the signal of M. De Vauban's re-embarking, had not been fired, it could not be doubted that his attack had failed, as the report of a single musket was not heard from the quarter of St. Barbé, and the enemy appeared very quiet in their entrenchments.

“ The young and brave Sombreuil, who had arrived the day before, joined those two experienced officers in persuading M. D'Hervilly not to attack; and he seemed to yield to their advice, when at the very instant, imagining he saw disorder among the enemy, he ordered the charge. This disorder was a stratagem.

“ The

“ The regiment of Hector was directed to move to the left, and to join the column of Du Dresnai. It was during this movement, at the moment when the two columns of the right came opposite to the entrenchments, that they were thundered upon by a battery, which kept up such a fire of grape shot as no military man ever remembered to have seen. In spite of all the valour of the officers, it was impossible for them to keep their soldiers to their duty, half of whom were already laid on the field of battle. They dispersed, threw away their arms, their clothes, and even their shoes, to fly with greater speed. The Marine Royale, out of seventy-two officers, had sixteen killed, and fifty-five wounded. Du Dresnai also lost a great number, among whom was its worthy lieutenant-colonel, who from Quiberon could see distinctly the towers of his castle, and whom the Republicans themselves lamented.

“ M. D'Hervilly seeing the disorder in the columns of the right, had scarcely given the word of command for, “ half round to the right,” when he received a shot which passed through his body, and put him entirely out of condition for future action. The indispensable precaution of nominating a successor in part of the command, had not been taken: nobody now knew to whom to apply
for

for orders ; and the enemy's hussars, supported by two columns, which issued from their entrenchments to pursue the Royal army, and impede its retreat, instantly threw the regiment Royal Louis into disorder, the only one which till then had preserved a shadow of regularity. The greater part of the artillery had been abandoned, for want of horses to draw it. Five pieces were in the hands of the enemy, who made use of them against the royal army itself ; they were the only ones fired in its retreat ; disorder was at its height.

“ M. De Sombreuil, who as yet was only known to the army by the brilliant reputation he had acquired on the continent, saw no means of repairing the disaster, and coldly replied to an officer who consulted him—‘ There is nothing to be done.’ In fact, but for the gun-boats of the English, which thundered upon, and stopped the republican columns, all would have been irretrievably lost, and the enemy would have entered the fort along with the royal army. General Boisseau, captain of grenadiers in the regiment Royal Louis, sustained with his company the efforts of the sharp shooters, and protected the close of the retreat. The troops, harrassed and discouraged, the regiments of Hector and Du Dresnai reduced to half their number, re-entered the peninsula,

peninsula, complaining that they had been led to slaughter.

“ M. D’Hervilly’s severe wound prevented him from having any share in the events subsequent to the affair of the 16th. He was carried off by his people on the morning of the 21st, and conveyed on board the Anson frigate, almost without the knowledge of any one, which was to land him in England. His friends, perhaps, will think that we have spoken too severely of him, while his enemies will accuse us of partiality. But we have no object but truth. This at least is certain, that although we may blame some of M. D’Hervilly’s military dispositions, or accuse him of errors into which he was sometimes betrayed by his natural vivacity, we are persuaded his intentions were always pure, and that he failed only through too much ambition of doing well.

“ The troops having returned very much disconcerted, after the affair of the 16th, desertion took place among them, principally in the regiment Royal Louis; between the 16th and the 20th, this regiment alone lost 150 men. The place by which they deserted was known; it was known that by wading through the sea, at low water, they got to a very great distance from the fort: these passages the Chouans might have been employed

employed to guard, being the kind of service for which they were most fit ; and yet it was not until the 19th that they were so employed. They stopped a corporal who was up to the neck in the sea ; he confessed that he was the last of 30 who had agreed to desert ; that they had no cause of complaint against their officers, and that their sole inducement to desertion was famine.

“ Let this answer be compared with what we have said above, and let it be asked what De Puiffaye and St. Morys were doing ? The answer will be—they were living at head-quarters in all the style of Asiatic luxury. De Puiffaye gave orders to a commissary to derange a whole magazine, to find under the packages a net to catch fish for his table ; relying upon what he himself called his *fortunate star*. He did not even give himself the trouble of visiting the posts ; he was distributing crosses of St. Louis, medals of merit, and brevets to the officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves on the 16th. By his sovereign will, or rather assumed power, he usurped the prerogative of the King ; and he caused St. Morys to be proclaimed lord lieutenant and governor general of all Brittany—one of the highest honours in France, which formerly belonged to the Prince of Rohan. He caused to be given out in general orders, the news of six advantages obtained

tained over the Republicans near Auray, in one day, by the army of the Chouans under the command of M. de Tintiniac. Even the soldiers themselves laughed at these rhodomontades."

In this manner did these dastardly chiefs, St. Morys and De Puiffaye, amuse themselves at the expence of the blood and treasure of this country.

ESSAY VIII.

ON the 17th the division under the command of Monsieur de Sombreuil was disembarked; it consisted of five regiments of infantry, Salm, Damas, Behon, Rohan, and Perigord; amounting only to about 1000 men fit for duty; but they were men to be depended upon, the greatest part of whom had already distinguished themselves on the continent; and every body lamented that they had arrived so late, or that they had not been waited for one day longer, and charged with turning the entrenchments of St. Barbé. In fine, all eyes were fixed upon M. de Sombreuil; his fine turned figure, brilliant courage, the talents he had already displayed

played on the continent, conciliated all the suffrages, all the wishes of the army. It was hoped his taking the command of the troops of the line, to which his rank of Colonel in the British service entitled him, would be given out in general orders. Nothing of this was done; scarcely did his own division receive particular orders from him. Instead of that essential part of the service to inspire confidence in a Chief, *Monf. de Langlet*, the adjutant quarter-master, continued to issue *De Puiffaye's* enigmatical orders; and from that period, as was natural to suppose would be the case, the uneasiness of the troops of the line was redoubled, as the erroneous measures pursued by *De Puiffaye* left them every thing to dread, as to the treatment they had to expect, should they be overpowered by the Republicans.

His whole conduct during the disastrous events of the 16th, renewed the apprehensions of treachery—another of his agents had been stopped with dispatches for General *Hoche*; in which it was rumoured he had reported the extent of the force under his command, and the quantity of provisions, stores, and treasures landed at *Quiberon*, and even invited *Hoche* to come and view the facts, promising a friendly reception as a brother, to co-operate in so laudable

able a cause, and assuring him he would find more than sufficient to supply the coalesced armies for six months, &c.

This is strongly corroborated by one of Gen. Hoche's declarations to his army on the 17th, viz. " This arrogant General, De Puiffaye, has at last divulged the substance of his secret mission to our distracted land. St. Morys, a well known impostor, a relation and colleague of De Calonne's, is sent to be the agent in their chimerical plan of succession to the crown in the *female line*. That poor deluded army of errants claim our pity; they were born in the same soil with us! they are Frenchmen led astray by the vicious and interested few of this vast nation. This is a fresh instance of the weakness that has brought on their misfortunes.—This same knave St. Morys (like his coadjutor De Calonne) have been long proscribed by all parties in France, have been denounced traitors in all other countries: they brought on the calamities which attended the Royalists in Champagne—and yet, strange to tell, they have committed their cause, and the last struggle, into the very same hands who have, under false prettexts, landed upon our coast and again betrayed them. This impostor, St. Morys, under the titles of *Comte de Carriere*, *Intendant General* and *Governor of all Brittany*, jointly with

with De Puissaye, makes overtures to me to betray the cause for which we have so manfully fought and so often bled! (says he) 'I come invested with full power to settle and form the new order of things, in which all those who accelerate my mission, and render great services, I shall appoint to the most distinguished employments in the new Government,' &c. &c.—However tyrants and their interested tools may deprecate our efforts for Liberty, our Government and our Laws, is not this proposition, and from such wretches, an insult even to the most insignificant state—then how much more so to the French Republic?—They ask for a parley to concert upon our joint plans of operation, and the most prudent steps to be taken with those (whom they term) the *turbulent fanatics in their army*. Well, we will indulge those two treacherous cowards, we can but benefit by the parley, and then by our next visit we will teach them to appreciate Republicans by our fidelity to our cause.—*Vive la Republique!*"

Next day, the 18th, in the afternoon, De Puissaye, mounted on horseback, accompanied by a number of his suit, under pretence of visiting the different posts, when, in la Falaise, an equal number of Republican officers also appeared, as if the rencontre had happened by hazard.

Both

Both parties advanced to parley, although De Puiffaye at first assumed the air of wishing to avoid a conversation, which was no doubt a scheme not to discover the previous correspondence with Hoche.

The Republicans prefaced the conversation by affecting to compassionate the fate of their prisoners. "All we desire (said they) is, that you would treat our wounded as we treat yours; we have torn our shirts to dress them. You have lost a worthy officer, (added they) a Monsieur Telouet—we regret him much."

At length, by stratagem, they arrived at the knowledge of all that was important. They compared the answers with the reports of deserters.—"Did you really believe," said they, to the Comte de Contades, whom they seemed most to respect, knowing him to be a good officer, and venerating the memory of his grandfather, the Marshal, and with a seeming candour, "that with the few troops you have, you can conquer us, when 200,000 bayonets could not succeed in the attempt?"

"It is not with bayonets," replied M. Contades, "we hope to succeed, but by the force of opinion, whose power you know so well. We have

have with us *millions of money*, and provisions to maintain an army of forty thousand men for six months—come, therefore, and share with us, like brothers, this money and these provisions. M. De Puiffaye has assured us you mean to unite with us!”

It was proposed to shake hands: the Republican officers refused being guilty of such flagrant bad faith. “Not to-day, (said they) we shall meet again: but you should write to Tallien, he is at L'Orient; you should come to a right understanding with him.”—They separated quite delighted with each other;—the Republicans had good reason for being so. They promised themselves speedy enjoyment, without dividing the treasures brought to Quiberon, and which they brought to pass the next day.

ESSAY IX.

THE night of the 20th was most frightful weather, a most violent west wind, a beating rain, one of those seasons which favours surprises, and which ought to make men keep themselves more particularly upon their guard.

Far from De Puiffaye taking a single additional measure, even the ordinary measures seem to have been neglected.

The guard of the fort was entrusted to M. de Falmont, its commandant, an Officer of Engineers; two of the regiments lately arrived had the ordinary guard; and this guard, according to custom, had been reinforced, about nine in the evening, by a half battalion of Royal Louis. It was the half battalion of the right of the first battalion which was this night on duty.

The troops were more occupied in seeking for shelter than in the vigilance so essential in such a night.

Some

Some officers of the guard saw a great number of patrols; but these patrols were clothed in red, (red cloathing brought for the Chouans) gave the word, and passed freely. The enemy, conducted by deserters, who were well acquainted with the position of the fort, and the manner in which it was guarded, filing one by one at low water, and climbing up the rocks, had already reached the platform; and (a thing unheard-of) this post, which had been guarded with so much care on the 16th, had not a single guard in it on the night of the 20th. Some artillerymen were asleep without fire in the *corps de garde*: one of their officers heard a noise, and, at the moment of falling into the hands of the Republicans, already masters of the platform, had only time to run to the cannon to fire three alarm guns. He could fire only two, the matches being extinguished, and the powder wet. The lantern could not be hoisted on the flag-staff, because it was already in possession of the Republicans; and the English squadron seeing none of the signals agreed upon, was ignorant of what was passing, and made no movement.

The *generale* was successively beat in all the cantonments. The second battalion of Royal Louis, which was in the nearest village, arrived the

the first, with its Lieutenant-Colonel M. D'Atilly, at its head. The commandant of the fort, astonished at the balls from the platform falling into the entrenchment, thought it was owing to some mistake; he went with the second company of grenadiers of Royal Louis upon the glacis, cried *Vive la Roi!* and told the troops in the platform that they were under a mistake.

The Republicans replied by the cry of *Vive la Republique!* and persuaded the grenadiers to join them, promising them their lives, and the cowards laid down their arms. About fifteen of them, faithful to their honour and their oath, retired with their officers, and received the fire of the Republicans, and of their late comrades. Then it was that M. D'Atilly received three balls which decided his fate; he was carried to his quarters, but died before he got thither. The enemy's columns were advancing in the mean time along the beach, or rather in the sea. Their column of the left was up to the neck in it, with the intention of turning the fort entirely on the right, when the fire of a battery of three guns, well served, threw this column into disorder, and forced it to abandon its plan, to cross the beach, and join the right column. They continued to advance, and to make themselves masters of the intrenchments, chasing the troops before them as

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they

they came up; one party capitulated and laid down their arms; another covered the retreat by a constant fire; while the Chouans, some wounded, and the officers, whose soldiers had capitulated, embarked in the boats they found on the shore, and with much difficulty gained the English ships. M. de Rotalier, de Contades, Damas, and many others, were employed to the last moment in stopping the enemy. They were at last driven to the sea. Those who were on horse-back attempted to save themselves by swimming. M. de Rotalier and de Contades, saved themselves by this means; Damas, with Adjutant-General Langlet perished. M. de Sombreuil, whose division was cantoned at the greatest distance, could take no position but that of a mill before St. Julien, at the bottom of the peninsula. He there stopped the enemy for an instant, then retired into the new fort, and being at length compelled to surrender for want of ammunition, he advanced towards the Republican officer, saying, " I ask
 " nothing for myself—I surrender—do with me
 " as you please. I ask only the lives of the
 " brave men I have the honour to command, and
 " who, as well as myself, are the victims of *per-*
 " *fidy and cowardice.*"

The Republican General promised more than he could perform, left him his arms, and doubtless

less felt himself more honoured by having such a prisoner, than by all the success of the day. Some individuals of this division effected their escape, but the number was very trifling.—De Puiffaye, unworthy of the name of commander, since he appeared no where, embarked the first of his army at four in the morning, and till he stepped into the boat, he employed himself with St. Morys, the Intendant-General, in getting off the gold intrusted to them, which they afterwards shared between them; and, instead of affording the smallest assistance in the retreat, the only notice they took, was to enquire and search for their own friends among the number that had escaped. Of 5000 troops of the line, it hardly amounted to 500. The Chouan women and children escaped nearly in the same proportion. The wounded officers and soldiers who had the good fortune to be carried off, amounted to about 150.—Through the cowardice of De Puiffaye, and his colleague, the Republicans pressed on so rapidly to the shore, that the Bishop of Dol, and many of the higher order of the clergy, fell into their hands.—Upwards of 6000 souls perished through the perfidy of those wretches, who had imposed upon our ministers.

The tragedy did not end here—the Bishop of Dol, Comte Sombreuil, the grand Vicar of Dol,
Charles

Charles de Broglie, 378 noble Emigrants, and 1276 foldiers and Chouans, were condemned by a Military Commiffion, and were fhot.

During an interval of feveral days, all thofe who had efaped on board the fleet were in the moft painful anxiety for the fate of thofe who had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Even the Britifh failors, with unufual feeling for a Frenchman, expreffed their noble generofity by their valiant offers to land and fave the brave victims of traitors. De Puiffaye and St. Morys were of very different feelings, and wound up the whole by a comic farce.—They caufed themfelves and friends, with the Britifh gold, to be landed on the ifland of Houat, and there lived in true Afatic luxury:—St. Morys in getting into the boat fell overboard into the fea, caught cold, and died of a fever upon the ifland. When upon his death-bed, he ordered, that when dead, his body fhould be laid in ftate, and buried with all the funeral pomp of the Intendant and Governor General, which actually took place, and all this at the expence of Old England.

ESSAY X.

TO elucidate our assertions, that upwards of two millions sterling, besides the human blood, had been sacrificed to the uncontrolled will of two such despicable wretches as St. Morys and De Puiffaye, we need only compare the estimates of the stores which fell into the hands of the enemy, with the bulk of the gold which was sent out of this country, when the sum of two millions will appear to be far below the loss which England sustained. We do not find by the several reports of Tallien, Blade, Hoche, Lamoine, or the Commissaries of the Army, that any other money than the false assignats had fallen into their hands; but they all seem to agree in valuing the stores alone (so cowardly abandoned) at forty millions of livres—*about one million seven hundred thousand pounds sterling.*

In one of the details of the expedition sent to England, it was stated "that for ten days previous to the catastrophe, all hands were laboriously employed in landing stores, provisions, arms, clothing, &c. &c.—There was scarcely a boat belonging to the fleet of transports, or the covering

vering squadron, but what was engaged in the above service. The Commander in Chief (but with very little foresight) during the time employed in carrying the said business into execution, exerted himself much, apparently as if he could not get them landed fast enough; as the whole fell into the hands of the enemy, of course the loss to this country must be great beyond conception," &c.—and the following extract of the Report, made the day after the defeat, July 22d, by Foucault, Commissary of War, will be found to correspond with the accounts stated in England.

“ I have spent the whole of this day in traversing the peninsula of Quiberon, which contains an enormous quantity of warlike stores of every description. The provisions that have been abandoned by the enemy, will be sufficient for the supply of the captors for at least six months: arms, clothes, accoutrements, harness and camp equipages, are too numerous to specify in an inventory. There appears to be enough of every article requisite *to equip an army of 40,000 men, with a proportionate number of cavalry and artillery;—wine, oil, rum, vinegar, brandy, rice, salt meat, dried fish, soap, sugar, tobacco, tea, coffee, biscuits and flour, are in such abundance, that unless they are removed to the interior,*
they

they not only risk to be spoiled, but OUR SOLDIERS
MAY BECOME ENERVATED BY LUXURY.

“ As I apprehend it is not your intention to leave this valuable acquisition of stores in this quarter, so contiguous to the British fleet, I shall take care to give directions for the collection of every vehicle that can be procured, in order to remove them to such places as you may chuse to appoint. Let me know with all convenience, whether I may not forward the biscuits and salt provisions to Port St. Malos, Brest, L'Orient, and the other sea-ports along the coast. Meanwhile, I think we cannot do better than regale our army with the luxuries they have acquired, and convey what is necessary for the supply of Vannes, and other garrisons in the neighbourhood.

“ We have got possession of several vessels laden with corn and rice, which we cannot suffer to incur the hazard of being captured in their passage to any of our own ports. In what manner would you wish their cargoes to be distributed? Shall I send part to Rennes, and other places adjacent? In my opinion, it would be most advisable to send them to towns that stand most in need of supplies. I beg you will signify your intention upon this subject; and,
above

above all, send as many carts and waggons as you can procure. The drivers will receive an ample recompense for their trouble; and the only article they need to bring along with them, is fodder for their horses," &c.

Extract of a Letter from LAMOINE, General of Brigade, to General HOCHÉ, dated Head-quarters at St. Pierre, 5th Thermidor, July 23d.

" I have sent you, according to custom, the prisoners, who, in the course of the night, were picked up by the patrols. The commissaries of war, and all the agents of government on the spot, are busied in taking inventories of the captured stores and provisions, which are so numerous and detached, that their task cannot be accomplished in less than a fortnight; indeed if they were collected in one magazine, I doubt exceedingly whether four thousand carts would be sufficient to remove the *provisions alone*, to a moderate distance, in the course of a month. A rough estimate has been made of their value, which exceeds forty-eight millions of livres, exclusive of the warlike stores. This valuable acquisition ought to be removed as soon as possible, to prevent deterioration. If you may judge of the object of the enemy from the state of their magazines, it must have been a monstrous

monstrous calculation of some of those Quixotic Heroes who amaze and disgrace the English Nation! and may now be considered as the closing scene of the civil war in the Vendee and Chouants, and the last desperate effort of the Emigrants. I wish you would come to the spot yourself, and I am sure you will admit that my report is not exaggerated.

“ N. B.—We have among other things whole casks of assignats. The soldiers amuse themselves in making bonfires of them. Several loads have been brought to me, which I believe are all that have escaped the flames. They are fabricated so nicely, and with such art, that the difference between them and the real ones, is not to be distinguished by a common observer. Tell me whether you think I ought to destroy them or send them to the Representatives of the People. None, I am confident, have got into circulation, so that neither our currency, nor our territories, shall in this attempt be contaminated by the machinations of the British.

(Signed) LEMOINE.”

“ I pledge myself for the veracity of the contents of the above letters. The disaffected, I expect, will accuse me of having made a wanton sacrifice of men in getting possession of Fort Pen-
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thievre;

thievre; to their calumnies I oppose facts, and refer them *to the urgency of the occasion, and the object of our opponents*. How great, vile enemy, ought to be your despair on hearing of the defeat of your DESPICABLE and DASTARDLY EMIS-SARIES? What unprecedented system (with civilized nations in war) will you next adopt?

(Signed) L. HOCHÉ, Commander in Chief."

On the 25th, Tallien in his report to the Convention, the same as did Gen. Hoche in his narrative of operations, states, "amongst immense magazines of all sorts of provisions, luxuries, and warlike stores that have fallen into our hands, the commissaries and agents employed have already made an inventory of 70,000 muskets—150,000 pair of shoes, and clothing complete for 40,000 men," &c. And Hoche concludes, by erroneously addressing the following observations to Mr. Pitt, instead of dedicating them to the real Quixotic authors of that expedition.

"See, now, Mr. Pitt, the result of your three years preparations! what sentiments do you next think of inspiring into those whom your numerous armaments could not save from national vengeance? Ask De Puiffaye (who hastened to re-embark at the sound of the first musket) whether the ruin of the Republicans is as easy to be effected

effected on their own soil as in your cabinet?—
Mr. Pitt, there is an avenging God; and your
crimes shall be punished.

(Signed)

L. HOCHÉ."

There is little doubt but both the reports of
Foucault and Lamoine were made appear to
the greatest advantage; but it is certain that
they came very near the description wrote to
England by a British Officer on the spot.

ESSAY XI.

OF such *disgraceful traitors*, arrant cowards, and
bad men as Calonne, St. Morys, and De
Puiffaye, too strong reprobation cannot be ex-
pressed; nor can too great light be thrown upon
the horrid catastrophe which these wretches
were sanctioned to bring about.

Since the revolution, it is generally known that
Calonne and St. Morys have been inseparably
attached, as necessary to each other, to carry on
their nefarious and rapacious speculations, and
have professed every principle, and adopted the
different systems of politics.

St.

St. Morys singular talents in fine *engraving*, and *printing* the paper currency of any country, was as necessary to Calonne, as his diplomatic intrigue was requisite to obtain a privileged currency, as for want of that occasioned St. Morys speedy flight from different nations, to escape being decorated with the artist's order, *le cordon gris*; and there are the strongest reasons to believe that he and his family have been the authors of the late dangerous *attack upon our credit*, as it lately came out upon a law-suit, that Calonne and St. Morys, when at Coblenz, sent to England for different English Bank Notes, (no doubt as models.) However of this, perhaps, young St. Morys has given a full account to the French Republic, as he has lately returned with his family to Paris. And, strange as it may appear, this very same young St. Morys, who was his father's greatest assistant in the False Assignat Manufactory, his agent in distributing them in all nations, and whose vigilance in their negotiation more injured the Republican credit than did all the combined efforts of the Emigrants who assisted in the same practices; yet this same Charles St. Morys (*soit disant* Comte de Carrier), with De Calonne's niece, have lately returned, and are re-instated in their ill-gotten property in France. To be sure we should consider he is the nephew of that

faithful

faithful minister, *able financier*, the *virtuous negotiator*, and *steady* politician Calonne, who probably in endeavouring to get *himself reinstated*, had more reasons than one for his late trip to Hamburgh.

There is hardly a doubt, from young St. Morys early experience in his father's talents, he has gone to France the *fore-runner* to make terms for himself and uncle, through a certain circulating medium resulting from their fine art.

As to the hireling tool De Puiffaye, what more could be expected of him than what he did? Indeed, no man but a wretch of his principles would have undertaken or understood the office he filled, to betray and sacrifice thousands for the sake of serving the ambitious views of the partizans of De Calonne's new system; but what heavy responsibility must be attached to those ministers who employed them; and what shame is not due to those false friends who ushered them in? It was well known to Ministers that De Puiffaye was a man of the worst of principles, very much resembling those of Calonne, as in the course of the Revolution he had occasionally acted the parts of Constitutionalist, Republican, Federalist, and at all other times either Jacobin or Royalist, as opportunity served.—Ministers
also

also were informed, in the most direct manner, what De Puiffaye and St. Morys would do with the money intrusted to them; but this warning did not prevail to save upwards of two millions lavished by such wretches.

After the catastrophe at Quiberon, and the death of St. Morys—De Puiffaye, to avoid the crafty intrigues of Calonne making himself the scape-goat, relanded in Brittany, with *a prodigious sum of our gold*; and as a farther proof of his principles, his connections, and the use he made of the money, he remained quiet, living in luxury, and in open friendship with the enemy, whilst the loyal partizans for the cause he pretended to head were sacrificed. Charette and Stofflet were of the number. After all this, would it not rather appear, that however destructive the conduct of De Puiffaye was to the re-establishment of the ancient government of France,—yet by no means the failure of the pretended object of the expedition was disagreeable to those ministers who joined in protecting the projectors and executors of it, since Calonne can, on all occasions, command their influence in his favour: And that De Puiffaye has full ascendancy over the War Minister; and that in spite of his bad actions, he now, from this country, enjoys about
eighteen

eighteen hundred a year, granted as a reward for his signal services, which the following letter will better explain, and prove the description not to be exaggerated:

TO SIR JOHN WARREN,

Commander of the English Fleet, on board the POMONA, under Fort Quiberon.

AURAI, June 22, 1796.

" SIR,

" I was far from expecting that it would have been my lot to send you a detail of the events which took place on the fatal day that brought me hither, and to have a severe examination instituted on the conduct of the false and dastardly traitor who has ruined our cause. M. De Puiffaye, having ordered me to take a position in which I was to await his orders, took the singular precaution of hastening to a ship which he secured for his retreat, and thus abandoned to their hard destiny a multitude of victims whom he sacrificed.

" The garrison of their fort having been forced, and the left wing of the division being already turned, the only resource that remained was precipitately

cipitately to re-embark, which was nearly rendered impracticable by the proximity of the enemy. The regiments of Hervilly and of Dresnai, abandoned or massacred their officers. The greater part of the foldiers, judging fo bad a position desperate, difperfed into the country. I found myfelf hemmed in by the rock, at the extremity of the ifland, with 200 or 300 gentlemen, and a few of the men, who ftill remained faithful to us, who were left unprovided with cartridges, none having been furnifhed but to the guards of the fort, notwithstanding repeated requests on my part; no doubt but M. De Puiffaye had his own reasons to juftify this conduct, which, we hope, he will condefcend to explain.

“ A number of veffels that ftill remained on the coaft might have afforded me the difgraceful retreat which M. de Puiffaye fo vigilantly feized; but the dereliction of my companions in arms would have been far more fhocking to me than the lot which awaits me (I believe to-morrow morning). I am bold to fay, I deferved a better; and this you will acknowledge, together with all thofe who know me, if chance will ever permit any of the companions of my misfortune to reveal to the world the myfteries of this fatal, this unexampled day.

“ The

“ The consternation of an undisciplined and disorderly body of men, deserted by their commander, in whom implicit confidence had been placed, rendered it impossible, from his stupid security, to take those measures for the general safety which he so providently secured for himself.

“ Thus bereft of every resource, I agreed to a capitulation, in order to save what could not escape; and the general cry of the army gave me to understand that every Emigrant would be made a prisoner and spared, like the others; but that I alone would be excepted.

“ Many will say, what could he do? Some will answer, he ought to have died. Doubtless I shall die; but as I remained the only person to watch over the lot of those who, the evening before, had twenty leaders, I could only exert what efforts were left in my power, and these were ineffectual. Those who left me no other to adopt, might rescue me from this responsibility.

“ I make no doubt but that the dastard will endeavour to give some colour to his flight; but I call on you by the laws of honour to communicate this letter to the Public; and, no doubt, Mr.

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Windham

Windham will be so good as to add to it the letter I addressed to him from Plymouth. Farewell! I bid you farewell with that calmness which can alone result from purity of conscience, and the estimation of all the brave men who at present share my misfortune, and who prefer it to the escape of the coward, who, not having courage to fight with us, ought at least to have forewarned me: that esteem I value as a pledge of immortality. I fall a victim to his cowardice, and to the force of those arms that were for a length of time not unfortunate to me. In this last moment I derive a source of enjoyment, if any can be tasted in a situation like mine, from the esteem of my companions in misfortune, and that of the enemy by whom we are conquered. Farewell! Farewell! all the world!

“ I am, SIR,

“ Your obedient Servant,

“ COUNT CHARLES DE SOMBREUIL.”

